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VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COLORADO:

THE

LEGISLATURE RUSHES IN WHERE ....
MICHAEL M. SHULTZ*

INTRODUCTION:

FLEXIBILITY AND CERTAINTY

Consider the plight of the developer who constructs a thirty-one
story tower. After relying on a flawed city zoning map, a court orders
the developer to remove twelve stories of the tower because "reasonable
diligence" by the developer would have led to the discovery of the
flawed zoning map.' Consider the developer who obtained all necessary
land use approvals for a high density development. Because proper procedures were not followed regarding the environmental impact assessment for the development, the developer must renew the approval
process. During that time, the local government downzones the property, reducing its value by more than ninety percent. The court informs
the developer that this is the risk of doing business. 2 These examples of
apparent hardship grab national attention and create the perception that
property owners require protection from the arbitrary and capricious
3
actions of local government officials.
There is an inherent tension between the interests of property developers and the public at large, who often think that development has a
negative impact. The trend in land use regulation is to individualize
land use approval processes, so that each proposed development can be
reviewed on its merits. 4 The extent of "dealmaking" between private

developers and land use professionals is ever-increasing. 5 Land use
*
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B. Young, both third-year law students, and Cynthia M. Harrington, second-year law student, at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
1. See Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York, 1988 WL 11488 (N.Y.C.A.). See also Court
Rules Building Must Lose 12 Stories, Kansas City Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at Al.
2. See William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
3. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the practice of local governments to amend the regu-

lations applicable to a development during the approval process).
4. See, e.g., Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 183 (1972) (examining innovative land use control systems that consider

development projects on an individual basis). Land use controls that incorporate performance standards are the most frequently used systems for individualizing project analy-

Generally, performance-based systems eliminate land uses as of right and permit
development only when the specific project proposal satisfies certain pre-determined critesis.

ria. See generally C. THUROW, W. TONER & D. ERLEY, PERFORMANCE CONTROLS FOR SENSITIVE LANDS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS (Planning Advisory Service
Report Nos. 307-08).
5. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 234-80 (1981) (extensive
analysis of dealmaking between landowners and the government). See also Fulton, On the
Beach with the Progressives, 51 PLAN. 4 (1985) (discussing dealmaking in Santa Monica,
California).
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professionals stress the need to maintain flexibility in regulatory
processes in order to ensure that development produces only a minimum level of hardship for the community. 6 The public often does not
see the need for development regulations until the need is brought to its
attention. By then, a specific project may already have received one or
more land use approvals.
Diametrically opposed to the public interest in regulatory flexibility
is the property developer's interest in certainty. 7 No business activity is
risk-free and businesses require a basic level of certainty before investments are made. The real estate development industry is subject to a
high level of market volatility, which makes the need for certainty in government regulations great.8 Developers point to the complex and uncertain government regulatory environment as the principal reason that
a lender will not commit to an otherwise worthwhile development. 9 The
developer's choices are few; either to fund the startup costs of the project, to pay excessively high interest rates on borrowed money, or to
defer the project altogether. Ultimately, according to the development
industry, it is the consumer who pays the cost of flexibility.' 0
The common law's answer to the conflict between flexibility and
certainty is the "vested rights doctrine." The doctrine states that the
government may not impose new or different regulations on the developer of real property after a developer has reasonably and detrimentally
relied in good faith on government approval.", The elements necessary
or sufficient to vest a right to develop property are the subject of an
ever-growing volume of case law. 12 However, many have been critical of
the judicial approach to vested rights, arguing instead for a statutory
6. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 213-14 (discussing the quest of
local officials for flexibility). The book mentions that numerous innovative land use controls have been developed to increase the flexibility of control over development; R.
FREILICH & P. LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 12-13 n.64
(1975) (identifying numerous zoning techniques that courts have held constitutional).
The most important innovative zoning scheme that state and local governments have
adopted is the "planned unit development." See also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-67-101 to 108
(1982).
7. See Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 Sw. U.L.
REV. 545 (1979) (examining the problems that developers of real property face because of
multiple permitting systems which exist at several levels of government). See also Sigg,
California'sDevelopment Agreement Statute, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 695 at 695 (1985) ("[O1n the one
hand, builders wanted assurances that after they invested substantial initial sums in a project, regulators would not change the rules . . .").
8. See Shultz & Kelley, Subdivision Improvement Requirements and Guarantees: A Primer, 28
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 26-27 (1985) (discussing the risk of failure in a residential development because of consumer conduct).
9. Id. at 24-26 (discussing the role of the lender in the land development process).
As the authors indicate: "[I]n the name of 'sound lending,' the lender can dominate the
development process." Id. at 26.
10. See L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS (1972); S. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS (1978). As an example of increased development costs resulting from land use controls, Seidel notes on page 120 that lot development costs in northern Virginia increased 74.1% between 1969 and 1975. In Colorado, a
developer estimated that the cost of a finished lot in one development was $12,000.
Ditmer, lltiter: Pioneer in Open Space Planning, Denver Post, Feb. 19, 1984, at II.
!1. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
12.

See generally C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUB-
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solution. 13
On August 27, 1987, the proponents of the statutory solution carried the day in Colorado when Governor Roy Romer signed into law
Senate Bill No. 219.14 After examining the common law's vested rights
doctrine, including its application in Colorado, this article describes the
new scheme of statutory vested rights embodied in S.B. 219, critically
evaluates the issues that the new legislation creates and finally, makes
recommendations regarding the contents of local regulations adopted
pursuant to S.B. 219.
I.

VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE

Since the right to develop property to its highest and best use is not
constitutionally protected, vested rights doctrines have evolved to protect a property developer from regulatory changes that interfere with or
restrict his government approved plans.' 5 Three basic analyses are alternately and concurrently relied on by different jurisdictions: (1) an
analysis involving common law equitable estoppel, (2) a due process
analysis, and (3) a "taking" analysis. 1 6 While all three theories overlap
to some degree, the distinctions between the first two theories becomes
7
blurred in practice.'
The doctrine of common law equitable estoppel holds that a party
who makes a representation may not repudiate that representation
which another has relied on to his detriment.' 8 Jurisdictions which subscribe to this doctrine conclude that because a developer has a "vested
right" to develop vis-a-vis the government's regulation, the government
LIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS (1982) (providing a thorough, if not exhaus-

tive, review of case law).
13. See generally Witt, Vested Rights in Land Uses-A View from the Practitioner'sPerspective,
21 REAL PROP. PROB. TRUSTJ. 317 (1986).

14. Senate Bill No. 219 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 to 106 (Supp.
1987)) [hereinafter S.B. 219]. It may be an exercise of literary license to suggest that the
Colorado legislature has rushed into the vested rights controversy. The Colorado House
was unable to pass H.B. 1360 in 1985 (House Bill No. 1360, Fifty-fifth General Assembly,
First Regular Session, 1985). The Colorado legislature then passed S.B. 60 in 1987 (Senate Bill No. 60, Fifty-sixth General Assembly, First Regular Session, 1987). Governor
Romer vetoed S.B. 60, and the legislature came back with S.B. 219. Senate Bill No. 219
changed the definition of site specific development plan, decreased the vesting period
from five to three years and specified the measure of compensation if the government
interferes with a vested property right.

15. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 9-10; Comment, Developers'
Vested Rights, 23 URB. L. ANN. 487-88 n.4 (1982). See Witt, supra note 13, at 317-19. See
generally F. BOSSELMAN, FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION (Urban Land Institute, 1976).
16. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Cunningham &

Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 64876 (1978); Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" andjust Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a
Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAw. 635, 635-45 (1986).
17. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648-76; Rhodes, Hauser & De Meo,
Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 13 STETSON L. REV. I,
1-4 (1983). See also Kudo, Nukolii." Private Development Rights and the Public Interest, 16 URB.
LAw. 279, 282-87 (1984).
18. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648-52.
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should be estopped from applying subsequently enacted regulations.19
Estoppel focuses upon whether, in light of the circumstances of each
case, it would be fundamentally unfair or unjust for the government to
apply a new set of rules to a particular parcel of property. 20 Generally,
two elements must be established before a developer may claim a vested
right by estoppel: (1) a reasonable and good faith detrimental reliance
upon a representation by the government, and that (2) such reliance
would cause an injustice to the developer if the government applied
21
contrary regulations.
The due process analysis, generally referred to as the "Vested
Right" theory or the "Vesting Rule, ' 2 2 focuses on whether the application of land use regulations to a developer's project bears a reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety and welfare. 23 The crux of this
substantive due process argument is that it may be unreasonable to allow the government to impose new or different conditions on development after previously granting approval for such development. Thus,
the developer has a "vested right" to develop his property in accordance
with the regulations which were in effect at the time of the initial approval. Although distinguished from estoppel theory's emphasis on
"fairness", the due process analysis essentially examines the same factors in determining whether a landowner has a vested right. 24 The doctrines are frequently confused, 2 5 and more often than not, will yield the
same result. 26 However, in those jurisdictions which may be unwilling
to estop the government from applying new regulations to a developer's
property on the grounds of basic unfairness, the question of whether7
2
such an application would constitute a due process violation may arise.
If a court will estop a government from changing development regula19. See id.; Hagman, supra note 7, at 548-51, 572-76.
20. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Witt, supra note 13, at

320.
21. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648; C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D.
PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Witt, supra note 13, at 320.
22. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 8-9; see also Whalers'

Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 251, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2, 8
(1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1976). In Whaler's Village Club, the homeowners of
Whaler's Village erected a rock revetment in front of 17 homes to prevent further coastal
erosion. However, the Regional Commission would only grant a permit to construct revetment if Whaler's Village would allow a public easement across beach property.
23. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 660-76.

24. Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union City, 317 N.C. 51, 344 S.E.2d 272,
278-80 (1986) ("[A] determination of the 'vested rights' issue requires resolution of questions of fact, including reasonableness of reliance, existence of good or bad faith, and
substantiality of expenditures"); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190,
192-93 (1973) ("[T]o have acquired a vested right to proceed with the construction, the
commencement of the construction must have been substantial, or substantial costs toward completion of the job must have been incurred").
25. See Comment, supra note 15, at 494 n. 41.

26. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766, 777
(1982), appeal dismissed sub nom.; Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Committee to Save
Nukolii, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (court applied estoppel theory to determine if city could

revoke developer's license after it made substantial expenditures).
27. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
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tions, the court may have no occasion to reach the due process claim. 2 8
Additionally, the due process claim may entitle the owner to damages
and attorneys' fees which are unavailable with the estoppel claim.
Jurisdictions which employ a due process analysis often analyze a
developer's project under a non-conforming use theory. 29 Just as the
government may not immediately abolish a non-conforming use except
by the eminent domain power, under the due process analysis a developer with a vested right is entitled to just compensation if the regulation
30
constitutes a taking.
SA third and relatively recent concept applicable to a vested rights
claim is that a developer, who has been unreasonably deprived of the
"beneficial use" of his property by government regulations, is entitled
to just compensation pursuant to the fifth amendment's "taking clause"
for the period that such regulations were applied to his property. 3 ' The
Supreme Court has apparently settled the issue-at least theoreticallyby its decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles. 32 The Court held that a property owner is entitled to just compensation when a statute or ordinance effects a taking of property under
the fifth amendment. 33 While this area of the law remains complex and
uncertain, some factors remain constant.
A developer challenging land use regulations enacted pursuant to
the police power as a "taking" has an extremely difficult burden of
proof. First, the developer must show that the regulations deprive him
of all beneficial use of his property.3 4 Mere diminution in value does
not constitute a taking. 35 Second, regulations may even destroy all use
of the property if the regulations are necessary to protect public health,
safety and welfare. 3 6 Third, all administrative and judicial remedies may
have to be exhausted before a court will find that the government has
taken a property without just compensation. 37 Variances, waivers and
other potential state remedies must first be exhausted. These factors
28. Id. at 191-92 n.12.

29. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 669-74.
30. See Sallet, supra note 16, at 637-45. See also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
31. See Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d
402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473

U.S.

172 (1985). See generatty Sallet, supra note 16.

32. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
33. Id. at 2388.
34. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the ordinance
did not prevent the best use of the land, and therefore, there was no taking).
35. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law did not constitute a "taking" of Penn Central's
property). See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245
(1987) (state statute required coal companies to leave 50 percent of coal beneath certain
structures. The Court held there was no taking because they failed to show diminution in
value).
36. See also Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (ordinance that prohibited the owner of a brick factory from operating the factory was constitutional under the
state's police power).
37. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'r v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-94 (1986); Sallet, supra 172, note 16, at 648-50.
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discourage a regulatory taking claim. 3 8

A.

The Common Law Rule of Vested Rights

Generally, the common law rule regarding vested rights is that the
reasonable, detrimental reliance, which is made in good faith, "vests" a
property right in the developer if it would be unfair or unjust to deny or
restrict his right to complete development. 3 9 The rule consists of three
elements.
First, the government must make some sort of representation,
through zoning or issuance of a building permit, which formally authorizes a particular use of the owner's property. 40 Informal authorization, 4 ' past regulations that once applied to the land, 4 2 and unilateral
actions taken by the landowner 4 3 do not constitute such
representations.
Second, the reliance upon the governmental representation must
be reasonable and made in good faith. 44 Reliance may be deemed unreasonable if the government act preceded the reliance by too many
years, 4 5 or if the developer was aware that proposed or pending changes
46
in government regulations might alter its development.
Just as knowledge of pending regulations may preclude a finding of
reasonableness, that knowledge also may preclude a finding of good
faith. The developer cannot be found to act in good faith if he has misled the government or induced it to act illegally. 4 7 While factors indicating good faith and reasonableness are similar and are often merged
when a court analyzes them, 4 8 jurisdictions differ, and the two concepts
should be kept distinct.
Finally, the reliance upon the government's act must be to the de38. The development of the reasonable, investment-backed expectations strand of
federal takings jurisprudence does suggest that the theory may prevail in a federal court
which may be more conversant with this area of the law. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
39.

C. SiEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13.

40. Id. See also Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 641-48.
41.

See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 17.

42. See Curtis v. City of Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210, 214-15 (1986)
(although the City tentatively passed the condominium project, the plaintiffs could not in
good faith rely on this prior approval).
43. Furey v. City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (the plaintiff's
improvement to his land became useless when the City designated his land "open space").
44. McCarthy v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 129 Cal. App. 3d 222,
241, 180 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (1982) (plaintiff was issued a permit prior to the adoption of
land use reglations; however, plaintiff's reliance on the permit was not in good faith).
45. P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372-73 (Colo.
1982) (court held it was unreasonable for plaintiff to rely on City's representation made
approximately six years previously).
46. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744, 746-47 (1971) (it was reasonable to deny plaintiff's building permit when there were regulations pending that
would prohibit the granting of the permit).
47. See City of Coral Gables v. Puiggros, 376 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979), appeal after remand, 418 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Godfrey v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment of Union City, 317 N.C. 51, 57, 344 S.E.2d 272, 278-80 (1986).
48. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13.
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veloper's substantial detriment. 4 9 Substantial detriment may be determined by examining the developer's change in position, and by
considering such factors as the total amount of money expended, the
obligations incurred, 50 and the ratio of costs expended in relation to the
total proposed costs of the project. 5 1 The detriment must be actual,
52
valuable and real-not just imaginary.
B.

Variations on the Vested Rights Doctrines

Vested rights doctrines, which have been largely created by state
law, differ widely among jurisdictions. 53 California follows the general
common law rule that a property owner who has performed substantial
work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a
government issued permit acquires a vested right to complete construction. 5 4 Under the "final discretionary approval test," a development
right may vest upon the last discretionary approval issued by the government agency. 55 In the frequently cited decision of Youngblood v. Board
of Supervisors of San Diego County,56 the California Supreme Court held
that if a final subdivision plat is in substantial compliance with all the
conditions imposed at the tentative approval stage, the granting of final
approval is only a ministerial act, and the development right essentially
"vests" with the tentative approval. 5 7 The right is only vested as to
subdivision regulations imposed by the local government and not
against regulations imposed by other government agencies. 58 The California legislature aided property owners by establishing that rights
under subdivision regulations may vest with tentative map approval and
that developers may enter into development agreements with the
59
government.
Utah follows an extremely pro-development vesting rule. Develop49. Delaney & Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land
Development, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 219, 222-24 (1979); Witt, supra note 13, at 322.
50. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
868, 679 P.2d 27, 33, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593, 599 (1984); Industrial Nat'l Mortgage Co. v. City
of Chicago, 95 Ill. App. 3d 666, 669, 420 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1981).
51. See Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 316, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
52. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 33.
53. See Part II of the article discussing the vested rights doctrine in Colorado, supra
note 9.
54. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal.
3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1083 (1977).
55. Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal (Zone Conservation) Comm'n, 48 Cal. App.
3d 534, 546, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 (1975); Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37
Cal. 3d 465, 475-76, 690 P.2d 701, 708, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228, 235 (1984) (Mosk,J., dissenting). See generally McCowan-Hawkes & King, Vested Rights to Develop Land. California'sAvco
Decision and Legislative Responses, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 770 (1978).
56. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1979).
57. Id. at 655-56, 586 P.2d at 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
58. See Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 795, 553 P.2d at 552, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
59. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 65865 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (development agreements); Id. §§ 66498.1-66498.6 (West Supp. 1988) (vesting on approval of tentative
maps).
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ment rights vest upon proper application for either a subdivision approval or a building permit. The Utah Supreme Court, in Western Land
Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan,60 fashioned a test that requires only: (1) that
a substantially conforming development plan was submitted prior to a
change in the law; (2) that the application of the change is not necessary
to protect public health, safety and welfare, and (3) that the change was
not pending when the developer filed his plan. 6 1 Thus, the right to develop may vest without any substantial investment or initiation of construction by the developer. On the other hand, the prospect that the
government may prohibit development under the guise of public health,
safety and welfare-even if substantial and significant detrimental reli6 2
ance has occurred-may be troublesome.
Maine's view of vested rights is slightly different from Utah. In
Maine, a development right may vest when the government takes the
63
threshold step of acting on an application for subdivision approval.
The Maine Supreme Court formulated this rule based on a state statute
which prevented the application of newly-enacted regulations to plans
pending final approval. However, more than mere submission of the
plan was necessary to cause the plan to be "pending." 6 4 Thus, the court
distinguished between presentment and acceptance of a plan.
C.

Vested Rights and the Subdivision Approval Process

The extent to which a developer acquires a vested right against
changes in subdivision regulations varies considerably, and may be determined by statute, common law, or a combination of both. 65 This section examines the acquisition of vested rights against changes in
subdivision regulations at three stages of the subdivision approval process: preplatting, preliminary plat approval, and final plat approval.
Generally, a developer has no claim to a vested right in subdivision
regulations before he has obtained government approval for the project. 6 6 The mere ownership of land, absent actions intended to establish
use, does not create any vested right to that use. 6 7 Enabling legislation
for subdivision approval usually authorizes a two-step process: first pre60. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).

61. Id. at 396.
62. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 37 n.182. See also Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of
Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968); Smith v. Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140
Vt. 178, 436 A.2d 760 (1981); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d
621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987) (all adhering to doctrine that a vested right is established upon a
substantially conforming application).
63. Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Me. 1982) (planning
board failed to process plaintiff's request for subdivision approval before the zoning ordinances were amended).
64. Id. at 1235.
65. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 74.
66. See Curtis v. City of Ketchum, Ill Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210, 214-15 (1986) (mere
acquisition of land gave developer no right to claim subdivision approval simply because
the city had once approved a similar plan for the site).
67. See Sherman-Colonial Realty Corp. v. Goldsmith, 155 Conn. 175, 230 A.2d 568,
572 (1967) (the filing of maps for proposed subdivision without any expenditures to improve the land does not vest right); Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244
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liminary, and then final plat approval. 68 Yet many local governments
use a three-step process. The first step requires the subdivider to file a
sketch plat which serves as a guideline to acquaint government officials
with the proposed development and allows them to familiarize the developer with pertinent regulations. 69 Where the approval process proceeds in three stages, rather than two, neither statutory regulation 70 nor
case law 7' appears to support the idea of a vested right resulting from
first stage approval. The purpose of the sketch plat is primarily informational, and providing information about existing ordinances does not
amount to a government representation warranting detrimental reliance. 7 2 Similarly, preliminary engineering studies 73 or architectural
plans 74 prepared for a developer's own use generally do not create
75
vested rights because they do not warrant reasonable reliance.
In most jurisdictions, the first stage in subdivision approval is the
submission of a preliminary plat for consideration by the planning commission. 76 The planning commission generally examines the detailed
plat to ensure that street, park, school and other public use declarations
are adequate, to ensure that state and local land use regulations will be
met, and to impose new dedication requirements. 77 Public hearings,
consultations with state and local agencies and the establishment of a
reasonable record are necessary before approval. Often, all the agencies
which have been consulted must give approval before the planning com78
mission or local legislature grants preliminary approval.
S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978) ("mere purchase" of land creates no vested right). See also Delaney
& Kominers, supra note 50, at 224-29.
68. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 35-38.
69. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, CASES & MATERIALS ON LAND USE 334 (1986).
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49 (West Supp. 1986) (developer receives protection
from changes in government regulation only after formal approval process).
71. See City of Ketchum, supra note 66.
72. See Colonial Investment Co. v. City of Leawood, 7 Kan. App. 2d 660, 664, 646
P.2d 1149, 1152-53 (1982) (replies to matter-of-fact inquiries do not constitute an act or
omission on which a developer may rely).
73. See Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 429, 119 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1954).
74. See Gosselin v. City of Nashua, 114 N.H. 447, 449, 321 A.2d 593, 596 (1974)
(plaintiff did not have a vested right to complete his proposed shopping center; therefore,
the new zoning ordinance prohibited the construction of the shopping center).
75. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 8 Cal. 3d
785, 797, 553 P.2d 546, 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 394 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977) (developers' expenses for their own planning would not serve to establish a vested
right absent government inducement or approval).
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-5-47 (West Supp. 1986). In some jurisdictions, the
approval process for minor subdivisions-those involving a minimal number of lots, requiring no new streets or extensions of off-tract improvements, and not having the characteristics of a planned development-may be subject to an abbreviated approval process. A
minor subdivision approval may require no public hearing, and the approval process may
move directly from the sketch plat to the final plat stage.
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.01(C) (Supp. 1987); CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§ 66475.4 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-133(4) (1986).
78. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 58.17.100, 110 (Supp. 1987). In Underhill v. Board of County
Comm'rs of Boulder County, 39 Colo. App. 185, 186, 562 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1977), county
officials properly denied plat approval on the basis of reports from the state engineer and
the state geological survey. The government may, in fact, grant preliminary approval conditional on the reports of referral agencies.
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Some jurisdictions require consideration of the plat in accordance
with the zoning ordinances and land use regulations in effect at the time
the plat was submitted, whether as a matter of common law, 79 or as a
matter of interpretation of state statutes designed to prevent the retroactive application of substantive legislation. 80 To avoid the expense and
frustration of needless delay, many states will approve a plat if the local
government does not act within a specified time after it is submitted. 8 1
Thus, a developer may obtain approval of its plat at a relatively early
stage, despite dilatory conduct by a government agency. 82 The merits
83
of such "deemed approved" statutes are debatable.
Preliminary plat approval does not create a vested right to final subdivision plat approval or the right to develop and sell lots. Frequently,
state statutes require the developer to submit a final plat for approval
within a specified time after preliminary approval. 84 Some jurisdictions
hold, however, that substantial expenditures made in reliance on preliminary plat approval, such as grading or the installation of utilities, creates
in the developer a vested right to final plat approval and a building
permit. 8 5
Many jurisdictions use the preliminary plat as a benchmark for approving the final plat. 86 Some states provide, by statute, that a local
79. See Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395-96 (Utah
1980) (developer may claim approval as a right if his plat conforms to ordinaices in effect
when it was submitted). On its facts, Western Land pertains to receiving final plat approval
after preliminary approval, but the holding is more sweeping.
80. Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Me. 1982) (construing
state statute); Smith v. Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140 Vt. 178, 179, 436 A.2d 760, 761
(1981) (construing state statute).
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4811 (1983) (plat deemed approved if no decision within
40 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987) (90 days);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-48 (preliminary approval deemed granted if no decision within
45 days); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(4) (McKinney 1987) (plat is approved if no decision with
45 days); see generally 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25.16 (3d ed. 1986).
82. See Pekar v. Town of Veteran Planning Bd., 58 A.D. 2d 703, 704, 396 N.Y.S.2d
102, 103 (1977) (developer entitled to plat approval when board took no action within 45day statutory period). See also Griffis v. County of Mono, 163 Cal. App. 3d 414, 428, 209
Cal. Rptr. 519, 528 (1985). In Griffis, the developer was entitled to plat approval when he
appealed from planning commission to county legislature, which failed to act within statutory deadline. Since "deemed approved" statutes are for the protection of the developer,
the developer may waive the deadline. But see Carmel Valley View, Ltd. v. Maggini, 91 Cal.
App. 3d 318, 321, 155 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210 (1979) (the subdivider consented to the extension; therefore, it did not violate the statutory 50 day period for approval).
83. For an excellent discussion of the policy considerations involved in granting developers such protection see West Main Assoc. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720
P.2d 782, 785-86 (1986); see also Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 93-94.
84. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987) (one year);
see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40.55D-49 (Supp. 1987) (three years).
85. See Florida Companies v. Orange County, 411 So.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (mortgagee acquired vested right by lending money on the basis of preliminary
plat approval); Knutson v. State, 239 Ind. 656, 668-69, 160 N.E.2d 200, 201-02 (1959)
(where the plaintiff laid streets and alley with government approval, the government could
not later reject the plat after the work was completed).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987). Conversely, under such statutes, a final plat may be rejected if
it does not conform to the preliminary plat and the conditions imposed on it. See Andorra
Nurseries, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Whitemarsh, 24 Pa. D. & C.3d 260 (1980), aff'd,
71 Pa. Commw. 480, 454 A.2d 698 (1983).
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government may not impose new land use or subdivision requirements
upon the development if the final plat substantially conforms to the approved preliminary plat. Other states offer even more protection by
prohibiting final plat rejection if new regulations were not in effect at the
time of preliminary plat approval. 8 7 At least one case has held that approval of a final plat, which is in substantial conformity with the approved preliminary plat, is a ministerial act. 88 Thus, although the
development right does not technically vest with preliminary plat approval, substantial compliance with the approved preliminary plat may
create a right to have the final plat approved in accordance with regulations in effect when the preliminary plat was approved.
Final plat approval does not necessarily create a vested development right. Although some jurisdictions mandate that a final plat may
not be rejected if it substantially conforms with the preliminary plat, 8 9
and others shield a developer who has obtained final plat approval from
subsequent changes in land use regulations for a limited time, 90 most
jurisdictions require that the developer actually rely to his detriment on
the approval of the plat before he can claim a vested right. 9 1 The construction of a retaining wall, 9 2 public improvements 93 and the conveyance of property or dedication of improvements 94 have all been held to
constitute sufficient reliance on final plat approval to create a vested
right to develop.
Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize that detrimental reliance
on the final plat creates a vested right to develop. In jurisdictions that
recognize a vested right only when the final discretionary permit or approval is issued or granted, reliance on the final plat will not shield a
developer from new land use controls. 95
D.

Limitations on the Effect of a Claim of Vested Rights
The concept of vested rights is qualified by two basic limitations.
87. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49.
88. Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County, 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586

P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).

89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

90. See PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 3, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986);

WASH.

REV.

CODE ANN.

§ 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987).
91.

See Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244 (1974) (merely because regula-

tions change, reissuance of a building permit cannot be denied when the plaintiff complied
with conditional plat); Town of Lima v. Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 752 (1977)
(as long as permits were acted upon before the new ordinance, the plaintiffs could have a
nonconforming use permit), aff d sub noma., Harper v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 43 N.Y.2d
980, 404 N.Y.S.2d 597, 375 N.E.2d 777 (1978).

•92. ,Preseault, 132 Vt. at 247, 315 A.2d at 244 (1974).
93. Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752.

94. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976);
Waid v. City of New Rochelle, 20 Misc. 2d 122, 197 N.Y.S.2d 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959),
aff'd., 9 A.D.2d 911, 197 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1959), affd., 8 N.Y.2d 895, 204 N.Y.S.2d 144, 168
N.E.2d 821 (1960).
95. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
679 P.2d 27, 32-33, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984) (approval of a tentative subdivision map did
not confer upon the developer a vested right).
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First, the state's police power to protect the public health, safety and
welfare may override any vested right that a developer may claim. Second, obtaining a vested right against one level of government or agency
does not necessarily confer a vested right against other levels.
Many statutes 9 6 and court decisions 97 guard against granting any
protection to a development that would constitute a public or private
nuisance. 98 To claim that an approved development creates a nuisance
or hazard, the courts must carefully examine the facts underlying the
alleged nuisance, balancing both public and private interests. 99 Thus,
while one court permitted interference with an approved development
which would cause downstream flooding,' 0 0 another upheld an approved development against new regulations despite the assertion that
the septic tanks would pollute the area water supply.' 0 '
Another major limitation on vested rights claims is that the representations of one agency do not necessarily bind another. Developers
claiming reliance on local government approval may not always be protected against state agencies representing substantially different concerns. 10 2 Yet some courts have recognized that actions of an inferior
local authority may bind a state agency if the two are acting in privityrepresenting the same concerns and standing in a quasi-principal/agent
relationship.' 0 3 Still, even within the same level of government, reliance
on the normal subdivision approval process may not create a vested
right against newly-established agencies with newly-expanded
04
powers. 1
E. Large-Scale, Phased Development
Vested rights issues become more complex in large-scale, phased
development projects. Although preliminary approval for all phases of a
96. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 66498.1(c) (West Supp. 1987) (tentative vesting map
will not confer any rights on any development which would endanger public health or
safety).
97. See, e.g., Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah
1980). In Western Land Equities, the court considered the city's argument that fire protection would be undermined if the permit was granted. The court ultimately rejected the

argument.
98.
99.

C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 38-40.
Id. See also Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500, 502-03 (Del. 1980)

(court upheld the injunction below and rejected riparian rights argument. The court
adopted a reasonable user test that balances the interests of upstream and downstream
owners).
100. Glassman v. Weldin Farms, Inc., 359 A.2d 669, 671-72 (Del. Ch. 1976), modified,
414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980).
101. Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 516-17 (Iowa 1980)
(the developer's vested interest outweighed Board of Health's concern that septic tanks
wold pollute the water).
102. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n v. Charles A. Pratt Constr. Co., 128 Cal.
App. 3d 830, 839, 180 Cal. Rptr. 555, 564 (1982).
103. R. CUNNINGHAM & D. KREMER, supra note 16, at 657-59; see also Department of

Public Works v. Volz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 480, 102 Cal. Rptr. 107, 112-13 (1972) (state highway department bound by actions of county highway department).
104. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984).

VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

1988]

development may come with the preliminary plat approval, final approval generally occurs one phase at a time. The developer does not
have to provide the infrastructure for the entire development, but only
for those portions which the government grants final approval. Since
preliminary plat approval may not confer a vested right, and the loss of a
right to develop any particular tract as planned may impair the value of
the entire project, the developer may incur substantial expenses and
complete several tracts only to face the possibility that the project may
10 5
turn out to be unprofitable.
In response to this predicament, many jurisdictions support the
proposition that if a developer, acting in reliance on a government approval, dedicates land or improvements pertaining to the entire project,
the developer then has a vested right to complete the entire project,
conforming only to the regulations in effect when the government approved the first phase of the project. 10 6 Conversely, if a jurisdiction
holds that only the final discretionary permit or approval creates a
vested right to build, then no dedication of land will give a developer
any vested right to complete a sequential development unless it com07
plies with the new regulations. 1
F. Statutory Solutions to Vested Rights Problems
Although the courts are largely responsible for the creation of
vested rights doctrines, several state statutes-in order to provide a date
certain for the vesting of rights-grant a subdivider exemption from
new land use regulations if his plans have reached final plat approval.l 0 8
These statutes are designed to circumvent the uncertainties and complexities of the estoppel and due process analyses of vested rights. 10 9
Vesting statutes vary in the length of time for which they give protection, in the extent of the protection they provide, and in the nature of
the rights they vest. But they may provide little protection if the development is later found to pose a threat to the public health, safety, or
welfare.' 10

The best example of statutory vesting comes from Washington
state. In Washington, it is possible for a developer to acquire a vested
105. See Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Berkshire, 32 Md. App. 22,
31, 358 A.2d 570, 579 (1976); Delaney, Current Issues in Land Use-Vested Rights, ALI-ABA
COURSE

OF STUDY,

COMPENSATION

LAND

USE

INSTITUTE:

PLANNING,

REGULATION

EMINENT DOMAIN AND

739, 748-49, 759-62 (1985).

106. See Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244 (1974); Town of Lima v.
Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1977), aff'd sub noma., Harper v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 43 N.Y.2d 980, 404 N.Y.S.2d 597, 375 N.E.2d 777 (1978). See also Delaney &
Kominers, supra note 50, at 241-47.
107. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Reg. Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed &cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083

(1977).
108. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987).
109. D. CALI.IES & R. FREILICH, supra note 69, at 197.
110. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66498.1(c) (West Supp. 1988).
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right to develop under state statutory law.' l ' Section 58.17.170 of the
Washington Revised Code provides that final plat approval must be
granted if the plat satisfies the rules and regulations applicable at the
time of preliminary approval. 1 2 A developer has three years following
preliminary plat approval to obtain final approval."1 3 Further, local governments may modify regulations affecting subdivisions within five years
from final approval upon a finding that the public health, safety and welfare necessitate application of the modifications. 1 4 Thus, a developer
in Washington has statutorily vested rights against changes in rules and
regulations for a period of up to eight years following preliminary approval, regardless of the existence of detrimental reliance." 15
Local governments are now entering into contractual agreements
with developers at the time land use or subdivision approvals are
granted."l 6 Development agreements purport to limit or modify land
use regulations affecting a developer's property in exchange for the developer's concessions to government,." 7 In this way, both the developer and the local government can spell out the exact terms and
conditions of development for each party, including the vesting of
rights.' 18
Prior to S.B. 219, four states authorized local governments to enter
into development agreements. 1 9 Development agreements raise the issue of whether the government may contract away its inherent right to
exercise the police power. 120 One commentator has noted that, if limited to a reasonable period of time, courts will likely uphold development agreements. 12'
II.

A.

THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN COLORADO

A Colorado View of Property Rights

Before specifically examining the common law vested rights doctrine in Colorado, it may be helpful to examine how Colorado courts
111.

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 58.17.150, .170 (Supp. 1987).

112. Id. at § 58.17.170.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115.
116.

Id. at § 58.17.150(1), (3).
See Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving Large Scale, Multi-Party
Development Problems, 1 FLA. ST. U.J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451 (1985).

117. D. Callies, Statutory Development Agreements: Analysis, Checklist, and Model
Agreement 4-10 (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
118. C. SIEMON & W. LARSEN, supra note 12, at 84.
119. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864 to 65867.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 46-121 to -132 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0201 to .0207 (1985); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220 to .3243 (West Supp. 1987).
120. Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926,949 (D. Hawaii
1986) (it is simply not within the City's power to contract away essential police powers,
such as the ability to make future zoning decisions); compare Geralnes B.V. v. City of
Greenwood Village, Colo., 583 F. Supp. 830, 841 (D. Colo. 1984) (local government
agreement not to rezone certain property for period of 25 years was not ultra vires, but
valid exercise of police power). See generally, Kramer, Development Agreements: To What extent
are They Enforceable?, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 29 (1981).
121. D. Callies, supra note 117, at 4.
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have viewed property rights. Their view has been shaped by the Colorado constitution, which provides that "[a]ll persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the
122
right of ... acquiring, possessing and protecting property .
1. The Constitutional Theory of Property Rights
Despite the acknowledgement of certain "natural, essential and inalienable rights," the Colorado Supreme Court has long held that zoning
regulations are constitutional. In Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 123 the
court held that a zoning ordinance adopted by the City and County of
Denver was constitutional. 124 The court responded to a vested rights
claim of a party who had acquired property for a brickyard prior to
adoption of the zoning ordinance. The court reasoned that "a vested
interest on the ground of conditions once obtained cannot be asserted
against the proper exercise of the police power-to so hold would preclude development."' 1 25 The court explained further that "[t]he exercise of the police power extends to so dealing with conditions when they
arise as to promote the general welfare of the people."'1 26 More recent
Colorado cases have concluded that "[t]he exercise of the police power,
be it in the enactment of land use controls, or as here, in decisions enforcing those regulations, must bear a rational relationship to the health,
12 7
safety, and welfare of the community."'
A second constitutional provision that Colorado has considered relevant to the vested rights issue is the prohibition on the general assembly's adoption of any law "retrospective in its operation."' 2 8 The
122. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. Other specific protections afforded property rights include a prohibition on the taking or damaging of private property "for public or private
use, without just compensation," id. at art. II, § 15, and the prohibition against depriving a

person of property "without due process of law," id. at art. II, § 25. Regarding the due
process clause, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated: "Any legislative action which

takes away any of the essential attributes of property, or imposes unreasonable restrictions
thereon, violates the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and
Colorado." City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 128, 347
P.2d 919, 924 (1960). The Denver Buick court took an expansive view of property rights:
"At the common law the owner of property has a vested right to make the fullest legitimate
use of such property." Id. Compare C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.
1974) ("due process and just compensation clauses of the state and federal constitutions
do not require that zoning ordinances permit a landowner to make the most profitable use
of his property").
The Denver Buick opinion should be given little precedential value. The Colorado

Supreme Court has overruled two different rulings in the case. See Service Oil Co. v.
Rhodus, 179 Colo. 335, 500 P.2d 807 (1972) (overruling Denver Buick regarding right of
government to terminate nonconforming uses); Stroud v. City of Aspen, 188 Colo. I, 532
P.2d 720 (1975) (overruling Denver Buick regarding right of government to require offstreet parking as condition of land use approval).

123. 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927).
124. Id. at 353, 255 P. at 445.
125. Id. at 353, 255 P. at 446.

126. Id. (citing Waltshor v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 289, 150 N.E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651 (1926).
127. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,

42 Colo. App. 479, 481, 600 P.2d 103, 104 (1979); see also Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 186 Colo. 418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974).
128. COLO. CONST. art. 11,§ 1I.Although the prohibition addresses only the general
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Colorado Supreme Court, in reliance upon this provision, held unconstitutional an attempt by the City and County of Denver to retroactively
apply a zoning regulation. 129 The court explained that the prohibition
on retrospective laws was broadly defined (retrospectivity) as an act "...
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
disabilcreates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 130
ity, in respect to transactions or consideration already passed.'
Within the framework of state constitutional protections for property rights and prohibitions on retrospective legislation, the Colorado
courts have established a vested rights doctrine that is independent of
any constitutional right. The courts clearly have made equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, the basis for a vested property right. An early
recognition of the applicability of equitable estoppel to government
land use regulations came in Pratt v. City and County of Denver. 13 1 In Pratt,
the building inspector issued a building permit for a parking garage.
One week later, the inspector revoked the building permit theorizing
that the garage was a public parking garage for which the city council
had to grant approval. The owner sued for injunctive relief to prevent
interference with the construction of the garage. The trial court held in
favor of the city and the owner appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the parking garage was not a public garage as the term was
defined under local law. 132 The court further held that the building permit was not revocable because there was "evidence that plaintiff, acting
in reliance on the permit, incurred considerable expenditures for work,
labor and material necessary for the construction of the building, prior
to the time of the attempted revocation of the permit."' 13 3 Thus, the
court determined that the city was "estopped to claim that the permit
[was] revoked . . .applying a well-settled principle."'

134

Interestingly,

assembly, the supreme court has held the prohibition applicable to local governments. See,

e.g., City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
129. Denver Buick, 141 Colo. at 140, 347 P.2d at 930.
130. Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528, 532-33, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (1979)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Moore v. Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, 10 P.2d 950
(1932)). What constitutes a law with retrospective operation may be a matter of form over
substance. For example, if the local government adopts new requirements as conditions
precedent to the issuance of a building permit, it may not be able to impose the restrictions against owners who already have acquired permits. The government may adopt a
new permit system that requires a property owner to meet the same requirements that
were added to those necessary to obtain a building permit and obligate the owner to acquire the permit before the owner lawfully may use his or her property. Compare Colby v.
Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 553, 255 P. 443, 446 (1927). Although the property

owner may claim a vested right to use his or her property free from the new regulations,
the owner could not, technically, argue that the new regulations were retrospective in operation. Indeed, in Colorado, the government may require a person who has obtained a
building permit under one set of regulations to obtain a new permit under amended regulations if there has been no detrimental reliance on the permit. See, e.g., Witkin Homes,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 414, 504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972).
131. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
132. Id. at 51, 209 P. at 508.
133. Id. at 54, 209 P. at 509.
134. Id. The court then made a reference to licenses to construct irrigation ditches that
become irrevocable after reliance on the license. The court stated that an irrevocable license was tantamount to an easement. Id. Although a license granted by one private per-
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the court noted that the local ordinance had set forth conditions for revthat the government had not shown any
ocation of a building permit and
35
of those conditions to exist.'
2.

The Estoppel Theory of Property Rights

The equitable estoppel doctrine has two key elements: (1) a representation and (2) reliance upon that representation.' 3 6 Cases subsequent to Pratt have contributed to these basic elements. 13 7 The
Colorado Court of Appeals has stated that a factual predicate for the
invocation of equitable estoppel is "a communication or action by the
city by which the property owner is 'unmistakably misled.' "138 When
the government issues a permit, the court will examine the face of the
permit to determine the scope of the representation made to the property owner. 139 When a property owner is unaware of local laws, he cannot claim reliance on any representation.' 40 In addition to permits
issued by the government, the statements of local officials may give rise
to an estoppel. 14 1 In Underhill v. Board of County Commissioners,14 2 the
Colorado Court of Appeals explained that statements made by a county
commissioner could give rise to estoppel only if the owner detrimentally
son to another may be analogous to a government issued permit, the two situations may
have as many differences as similarities.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., City of Sheridan v. Keen, 524 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Colo. App. 1974) (not
selected for official publication).
137. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
138. LaFollette v. Board of Adjustment of Lakewood, 741 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Colo. App.
1987). In LaFollette, the lessee of certain property annexed by Lakewood obtained a building permit for a storage barn in a CN-Conservation zoning district. The lessee subsequently stored construction equipment in the barn. After complaints by neighbors, the city
advised the lessee that he was in violation of zoning regulations. The lessee invoked estoppel against the government's contention that his use violated local zoning regulations.
The court focused on the scope of the permit issued to the lessee and held that the permit
was only to construct a storage barn, which presumably, would have been used for the
storage of agricultural equipment as allowed in a CN district. Thus, the court determined
that the government had not represented that the use of a storage barn for storing construction equipment was permissible under local law. Id. at 1263-64.
The LaFollette court's emphasis on a government representation or action may be an
overstatement. If one relies on existing zoning regulations, a vested right may accrue absent any representation by the government. The theory supporting the vested right may
not, however, be equitable estoppel. Compare City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles
Corp., 181 Colo. 356, 509 P.2d 797 (1973).
139. See P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Colo.
1982) (city made no representation about future availability of water and sewer services
when it issued water and sewer tap permits); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 372,
473 P.2d 725, 730 (1970) (building permit authorized construction of apartment building
and not only a foundation for apartment building); LaFollette supra note 138 at 1263-64
(building permit authorizing construction of storage barn did not authorize the storing of
construction equipment in that barn).
140. See Webster Properties v. Board of County Comm'rs, 682 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.
App. 1984) (owner could not claim reliance on local law when it became aware of zoning
resolution only after it platted land).
141. But see Witkin Homes, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 414,
504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972) (plaintiff may not have been able to demonstrate reliance
because no building permit had been issued)..
142. 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977).
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relied on the statement.1 4 3 In other cases, the effort to invoke equitable
estoppel failed when the court could not find either a sufficient representation to bind the government or the consequent reliance on the
representation. "44
In addition to a representation by the government, equitable estoppel requires reliance or a change in position as a result of the representation.1 4 5 The reliance must be more than conduct preparatory to
actual development. 14 6 The Colorado Court of Appeals explained the
rationale for this rule in Ti-State Generation and Transmission Association,
Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners.1 47 The court stated that "[L]ogically
extended (the rule) would mean that developers, by spending money on
planning, could thereby prevent application of future land use controls
to their land."14 8 On the other hand, when the owner has incurred substantial out of pocket expenses for actual construction, the right to complete construction will vest, even under an erroneously issued building
49
permit. '
143. Id. at 188, 562 P.2d at 1127.
144. See Colby v. Board of Adjustments, 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927) (statement by
government official that new zoning ordinance would not apply to owner's property did
not estop the government from so applying the new ordinance); City of Sheridan v. Keen,
524 P.2d 1390 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication) (statements made
to owner about use of property and right of owner to seek variance did not estop government from prohibiting use).
145. See generally Underhill, 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125.
146. See Cline v. City of Boulder, 168 Colo. 112, 119, 450 P.2d 335, 339 (1969) (property owner who acquired building permit was in no more than "dream stage" concerning
construction of gas station); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 348, 255 P. 443,
445 (1927) (purchase of land and expenditure of $5,000 did not vest right to build brickyard); Tri-State Generation and Transp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 42 Colo.
App. 479, 600 P.2d 103, 105 (1979) (power company's preparatory work in acquiring easements and spending money on plans did not vest right to construct transmission lines); but
see Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 377, 473 P.2d 725, 731 (1970) (work done
before issuance of building permit "should not be totally ignored" when determining level
of reliance).
147. 42 Colo. App. 479, 600 P.2d 103 (1979).
148. Id. at 481, 600 P.2d 105 (1979).
149. See City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957).
In Stackhouse, the owner received a building permit to construct an apartment building on
the mistaken assumption that his property was in a "C" zoning district, which required a
minimum lot size of 4,000 square feet to construct a four-plex. Later, the city determined
that the property actually was in a "B" zoning district and ordered the owner to stop work
because the minimum lot size for a four-plex was 12,000 square feet. In fact, the building
permit stated that it was for a parcel in a "B" district, but the owner alleged that he never
looked at the permit after it was issued. The court held that the owner's substantial reliance valued to be $18,000, and estopped the government from denying the validity of the
permit. Id. at 293, 310 P.2d at 298. See also Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 376,
473 P.2d 725, 731 (1970). In Crawford, the court found that the government was estopped
for imposing new height restrictions on an apartment complex after issuance of a building
permit and reliance by the property owner. The owner had razed an existing structure on
the site, made further financial commitments and had obtained additional architectural
drawings. Id. The Crawford case reveals a rather simplistic view of the equitable estoppel
doctrine which is invoked to prevent manifest injustice. See Stackhouse, 135 Colo. at 293-94,
310 P.2d at 297. The Crawford court determined that imposing new height restrictions on
the developer of the apartment complex would create injustice because the building would
only be seven stories under the new regulations rather than fourteen. The court could
have determined whether the developer would have made the same investment if the original regulations had allowed only a seven story building. Similarly, the court might have
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At least one Colorado court has determined that the cost of obtaining additional approvals may vest a right under earlier approvals obtained from another level of government. 150 This holding is consistent
with the general doctrine that detrimental reliance on a permit may estop the government from changing development regulations, but it may
not be consistent with the rule that mere preparatory work will not vest a
right. 151 Of course, what is merely "preparatory" is a matter of perception, which may be affected by the fact that the government has approved a land use application.
Although case law in Colorado is sparse, there are indications that
reliance on a permit must be reasonable and made in good faith. In P-W
Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 152 the court concluded that the developer's alleged reliance on a development agreement (or on water and
sewer tap permits) could not be reasonable because the government
never represented that water and sewer service would be available indefinitely. 1 53 Similarly, in Cline v. City of Boulder, 154 the court noted that it
could "infer from the evidence that the Clines obtained a [building] permit merely as a tactic."' 15 5 Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that an owner's reliance on a government official's apparent au56
thority is reasonable.1
Once it is determined that a property owner may acquire a vested
right under an equitable estoppel theory, the next issue concerns the
scope of that right. Despite any express holding by the Colorado
Supreme Court, the court of appeals has regularly suggested that equitable estoppel will not be invoked as freely against the government as
against private persons. 15 7 Certainly, nothing in the supreme court's
seminal decision in Prattv. City and County of Denver 158 suggests this limitation. When estoppel is available to a property owner, the doctrine will
apply even if development may threaten public health and safety and
there is no evidence that the government received new information foldetermined whether the new regulations would permit the developer a reasonable return
on its investment. See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1974) (owner
has no right to most profitable use of its property).
150. Saur v. County Comm'rs of Larimer County, 525 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1974)
(not selected for official publication). In Saur, the owner obtained a permit to operate a
quarry in an agricultural district. The owner then spent a substantial sum inseeking additional permits from the Department of Natural Resources and the State Air Pollution
Commission. The court held that this reliance estopped the government from changing
the owner's use to one permitted only by special review. Id. at 1176.
151. See supra note 147.
152. 655 P.2d 1365 (Colo. 1982).
153. Id. at 1371.
154. 168 Colo. 112, 450 P.2d 335 (1969).
155. Id. at 119, 450 P.2d at 339.
156. Franks v. City of Aurora, 147 Colo.25, 27, 362 P.2d 561, 563 (1961). Franks is not
a vested rights case, but deals with equitable estoppel and holds that an owner that altered
construction plans for a drainage culvert under instructions of a city engineer could not be
sued by the city when the inadequately sized culvert subsequently caused flooding
damage.
157. See, e.g., Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. App.
1985), cert. denied (1986).
158. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
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lowing its approval. 159 In fact, Colorado courts do not appear to weigh
hardships when determining whether an owner may invoke equitable estoppel against the government. 160
A property owner who acquires a vested right within one government jurisdiction may exercise that right even if another government
annexes the property. The Colorado Supreme Court made this apparent in Cline v. City of Boulder,' 6 1 although it ultimately determined that
the owners had not relied to their detriment on a building permit issued
62
by Boulder County. 1

Another Colorado court has suggested that estoppel may not be invoked against the government "where such estoppel would require violation of the law." 16 3 This limitation on the equitable estoppel doctrine
should not be read too broadly. In City and County of Denver v.
Stackhouse, t 64 the supreme court held that the government was estopped
from denying the validity of a permit that it had issued.' 6 5 Thus, the
court actually countenanced an illegal act - perhaps two: (1) illegal to
issue the permit and (2) illegal to use the property in the manner approved for. Similarly, in Underhill v. Board of County Comm'rs, Boulder
County 166, the court of appeals suggested that since approval was ministerial, the board might have had to approve a subdivision plat if the de67
veloper had relied on a misstatement of law made by a commissioner. 1
An issue that may arise occasionally is whether protectable vested
property rights exist for neighbors of property under a land use application. In Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 16 8 the supreme court declared that
159. See Williams v. Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). In Smith, the government
could revoke a building permit based on a danger to public health and safety if there was
"additional information to that body showing some danger to health and safety, of which
its members were not informed at the time of the resolution [authorizing construction of a
filling station and directing issuance of a building permit]." Since the trial court did not
allow in evidence of reliance, the supreme court was unable to determine whether a development right had vested. Id. at 153, 230 P. at 397.
160. See, e.g., Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 473 P.2d 725 (1970).
161. 168 Colo. 112, 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (involving property involuntarily annexed).
162. Cline, 450 P.2d at 339. See also City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles Corp.,
181 Colo. 356, 509 P.2d 797 (1973), where the court held that the city could not modify
minimum lot size requirements after the developer had platted property under Arapahoe
County regulations and constructed infrastructure for the subdivision. Although TransRobles was decided on due process grounds, it may easily have been an equitable estoppel
case. The obvious difficulty with applying the estoppel against an annexing municipality is
that government did not make the representation on which the owner relied. See supra
notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
163. Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. App. 1985) (cert.
denied 1986).

164. 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957).
165. Id.
166. 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977).

167. Id. It is not necessary that a court hold that the government is estopped from
changing a representation that is made erroneously, whether it is a verbal expression or
permit. At most, the equitable estoppel doctrine might be applied only when the government correctly and legally represents to the owner of property what his or her development rights are. The answer, of course, is that injustice occurs when the government
alters its representation after detrimental reliance by the owner regardless of the accuracy
or legality of that representation.

168. 198 Colo. 528, 603 P.2d 130 (1979).
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neighbors had no "vested right, per se, in the maintenance of a particular zoning classification." 169 The court of appeals dealt with this matter
when the neighbors raised the equitable estoppel doctrine. In Bentley v.
Valco, Inc.,170 the court determined that equitable estoppel was not available to an owner who allegedly bought his property after the county had
denied a special use permit. The application was for a strip mine on
property which was adjacent to the plaintiff's, even though the county
approved a second application.171 The court concluded that either the
government had made no representation to the neighbor or that it was
unreasonable for the neighbor to believe that the government would
72
never grant the permit.1
The Colorado Supreme Court eschewed a vested rights equitable
estoppel theory in City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles Corp.173 In
Trans-Robles, the city had argued that the facts were insufficient to establish estoppel against the government.' 74 The court, however, determined that the city could not downzone property that had been annexed
because the owner had platted the property for one-half acre lots consistent with Arapahoe County zoning regulations that had been applied
before annexation, and had constructed infrastructure in the subdivision
appropriate for the half-acre configuration. 17 5As a result of the evidence, the property could not be used if rezoned for a minimum lot size
of two and one-half acres, and the court held the rezoning was confisca76
tory and unconstitutional.1
The court's theory supporting the invalidation of the rezoning in
Trans-Robles is troublesome. The owner's property could likely have
been used for two and one-half acre lots-the change would simply have
been costly and economic waste might have resulted. The better reasoning would have been that Trans-Robles' development rights had
vested because of its detrimental reliance on Arapahoe County's land
use regulations. The court may have been reluctant to apply the equitable estoppel doctrine against the city since the city had not made any
representation to the developer, or the court might have thought that
evidence of issuance of a building permit was necessary to invoke equita77
ble estoppel. 1
One might ask why the Colorado courts have held that detrimental
reliance on some government representation, such as a permit, is necessary to vest a property right. Why have the courts generally analyzed the
vested rights problem within the framework of equitable estoppel? The
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
741 P.2d 1266
Id. at 1269.
Id.
181 Colo. 356,
Id. at 360, 509
Id. at 360, 509
Id. at 360, 509

177.

Compare Witkin Homes, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410,

(Colo. App. 1987).

509 P.2d 797 (1973).
P.2d at 799.
P.2d at 798.
P.2d at 799.

414, 504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972) (owner could not demonstrate reliance considering that
no building permit had issued).
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answer is that the courts quickly concluded that no property rights
vested under even a validly issued permit until there had been reliance
on the permit.1 78 One can trace Colorado law on the rights that attach
to a validly issued building permit back to Pratt v. City and County of Denver. 17 9 Although the court applied the equitable estoppel doctrine
against the government, the court found that the government had not
shown any of the conditions set forth by local laws under which a building permit could be revoked. 18 0 Thus, all that the court assumed was
that local law could provide for the revocation of a building permit on
certain conditions. Two years later, however, in Williams v. Smith, 18 1 the
supreme court wondered whether a city council would have the power to
rescind a building permit before expenditures were made in reliance on
the permit. Citing Pratt, the court stated that it saw "no valid answer to
such a proposition."' 18 2 It now appears firmly embedded in Colorado
law that one acquires no property right under a permit or other land use
approval unless there has been detrimental reliance on the permit or
83
approval. 1
Before examining the Colorado legislature's response to vested
rights problems, it is appropriate to evaluate whether Colorado judicial
treatment of landowners justified the legislative action. Since the Colorado courts have viewed the issue of vested rights from an equitable estoppel perspective, judicial evaluation of vested rights claims is superior
to any legislatively prescribed formula unless the legislature views
vested rights from a different perspective.1 84 The courts are in a better
position than the legislature to make the type of ad hoc inquiry that is
necessary to determine whether the government should be estopped
from changing development regulations applicable to certain property.
A review of the case law demonstrates that Colorado courts have
178.

See Cline v. City of Boulder, 168 Colo. 112, 118, 450 P.2d 335, 338 (1969):

The basic legal question involved is simply, does a building permit per se vest
such a property right in the owner that subsequent rezoning is ineffective as to
the property? The majority rule in the United States is that the owner must take
some steps in reliance on the permit before his fights vest thereunder.

179. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
180. Id. at 55, 209 P. at 509.
181. 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924).
182. Id. at 154, 230 P. at 396. Presumably, this meant that it was irrefutable that the
government could revoke the permit. See also Elam v. Albers, 44 Colo. App. 281, 282, 616

P.2d 168, 169-70 (1980) (conditional use permit gave an owner no more rights than it
would have under basic zoning ordinance). Crittenden v. Hasser, 41 Colo. App. 235, 585
P.2d 928 (1978), relates to this issue in holding that new regulations may be applied to a
land use application if they are pending at the time of the application and the government
does not unreasonably delay in acting on the application.
183. Unfortunately, the case law does not express with certainty whether a building
permit itself is necessary to vest a property right - assuming the requisite reliance. This
could raise substantial problems for property owners in Colorado counties that do not

enforce building codes with a building permit process.
184. The Colorado legislature has, indeed, viewed the vested rights issue from a radically different perspective. The legislative response in S.B. 219 does not consider detrimental reliance relevant to a vested property right claim, rather the legislative focus is on
the permit or approval that the government grants and the rights that attach to that permit

or approval. This "property rights" approach is different from the Colorado courts' equitable estoppel approach.
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treated landowners fairly.' 8 5 The general rule in Colorado is that a
right to develop or use property will vest when a landowner has suffered
detrimental reliance as the result of some land use approval. The reliance must be made reasonably and in good faith, and must be more than
preparatory work done in conjunction with a project. The Colorado
courts have been somewhat pro-landowner in refusing to balance equities, once it has been determined that the elements of equitable estoppel
are present. At the same time, the courts have preserved flexibility in
the land use regulatory process by permitting the government to modify
development regulations after land use approval when the landowner
cannot demonstrate sufficient or detrimental reliance. This scheme affords a reasonable level of certainty to landowners who wish to develop
their properties while allowing for a sensible measure of flexibility for
the land use regulatory process.
B.

Statutory Vested Rights in Colorado: Senate Bill 219
1.

Definitions Under Senate Bill 219

Senate Bill No. 219 drastically changed vested rights law in Colorado. The most obvious change was the legislature's rejection of the
need for any detrimental reliance to vest a property right.
Senate Bill No. 219 defines a vested property right ("VPR") as "the
right to undertake and complete the development and use of property
' 18 6
under the terms and conditions of a site specific development plan.'
In other words, a landowner has the right to proceed with a project free
from the effects of local government regulations adopted subsequently
to the time the landowner receives approval for the project. 18 7 The statute defines landowner as any owner of a legal or equitable interest in
real property, including heirs, successors and assigns. 188
In addition, "site specific development plan" is defined as "a plan
which has been submitted to a local government by a landowner or his
representative describing with reasonable certainty the type and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property."' 8 9 The statute
provides that the site specific development plan "may be in the form of,
but need not be limited to, any of ten different plans or approvals."' 190
It remains for the local government to determine when a plan or ap185.
186.

See supra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102 (5) (Supp. 1987).

187. Section 24-68-105(1) also addresses the effect of a VPR. The section is labeled
"Subsequent regulation prohibited--exceptions."

It prohibits the government from tak-

ing "any zoning or land use action" that would interfere with the VPR. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-68-105 (1) (Supp. 1987). The prohibition appears to apply to action taken pursuant
to regulations in effect at the time that the government approves a site specific development plan, in addition to regulations adopted subsequent to that approval. It cannot be
the intention of the legislature, however, to provide that one land use approval entitles a
developer to favorable treatment during subsequent, discretionary approval processes. See
infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text, concerning the horizontal vesting effects of S.B.
219.
188. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102 (1) (Supp. 1987).
189. Id. at § 24-68-102 (4) (Supp. 1987).
190. Id.
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proval constitutes a site specific development plan that will trigger a
VPR.191 The determination may be made by "ordinance, regulation or
upon an agreement entered into by the local government and the landowner." 19 2 "[T]he document that triggers the [VPR] shall be so identified at the time of its approval." 1 9 3 It is not clear whether that
document refers to the agreement only or to an ordinance, regulation or
agreement.1 94 Neither a variance, a sketch, nor a preliminary plan con19 5
stitute a site specific development plan.
Under the statute, a "local government" refers to "any county, city
and county, city, or town, whether statutory or home rule, acting
through its governing body or any board, commission, or agency .. .
having final approval authority over a site specific development
plan."' 19 6 An urban renewal authority constitutes a local government
97
for purposes of the statute.1
2.

Creating a VPR

A VPR is created when a local government approves (or conditionally approves) a site specific development plan, following notice and
public hearing. 19 8 Once the VPR is established, it remains in effect for
three years. 199 The local government, however, can extend the threeyear vesting period by approving amendments to the site specific development plan that expressly authorize an extension. 20 0 The government
also may exceed the three-year period by entering into a development
agreement with the landowner if the excess period is warranted in light
of all relevant circumstances, including the project's size and phasing,
20 1
economic cycles and market conditions.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. This issue may be important in determining the local government's role under the
statute. See infra notes 230-34 and 296-99 and accompanying text. The better interpretation is that "document" refers only to the development agreement which must be designated expressly as creating a VPR. Ordinances and regulations that establish VPR's do
not need to be designated expressly in estabishing the VPR's because definition of a site
specific development plan controls its establishment.
195. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
196. Id. at § 24-68-102(2).
197. Id.
198. Id. at § 24-68-103(1). This creates the somewhat paradoxical situation that issuance of a building permit alone does not create a VPR unless the government gives notice
of and holds a hearing on the application for the permit. Under common law principles,
detrimental reliance on the building permit should vest the property. See Williams v.
Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). Consequently, a local government may possibly
avoid establishment of a VPR by declining to give notice of a hearing on a land use application. The requirements of procedural due process may, however, dictate that the government give notice of and hold a hearing on the application. See generally Kahn, In
Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS

L.Q 1011 (1979).
199. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(1) (Supp. 1987).

CONST.

200. Id.
201. Id. at § 24-68-104(2). The difference between the terms "extend" and "exceed"
in the statute is that the government may enter into a development agreement at the time
of a land use approval and create a vesting period in excess of three years or enter into a
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The local government can conditionally approve a site specific development plan 20 2 as well as impose certain terms-and conditions, as
long as the terms and conditions are reasonably necessary to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare. Furthermore, a VPR can be forfeited
prior to the end of the three-year vesting period if the landowner does
20 3
not comply with the terms and conditions of plan approval.
The local government's approval of the site specific development
plan is effective on the date of the ordinance or resolution approving the
plan. 20 4 The approval, however, is subject to all rights of referendum
and judicial action. 20 5 The time limits for instituting the referendum or
judicial action begin on the date of publication of the approval or on the
date of notice advising the general public of the approval, not on the
effective date of the approval. 20 6 Publication or notice must occur
20 7
within fourteen days following the approval.
Although it appears out of place, the statute provides that zoning
not a part of a site specific development plan does not establish a
VPR. 20 8 This apparently means that no landowner may claim a right to
develop based on the fact that the existing zoning is consistent with
owner's intended use. The owner would need some other land use approval or would need to have had his property rezoned to vest the development right.
Once a local government approves the site specific development
plan and creates a VPR, any zoning or land use action taken by the local
government is precluded if the action would alter, impair, diminish or
delay the development or use of the property.2 0 9 There are four excepdevelopment agreement only and create an original vesting period in excess of three years.
The government may not enter into a development agreement to "extend" the vesting

period.
202. Id. at § 24-68-103(1). The statute authorizes the government to conduct subsequent reviews of the conditionally approved development to ensure its compliance with
applicable conditions. Id. at § 24-68-104(3).
203. Id. at § 24-68-103(1).
204. Id.
205. Id. The drafters of S.B. 219 probably believed that judicial review would occur
through COLORADO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 106. The rule is the exclusive method of

review for land use actions which may be characterized as quasi-judicial. See Snyder v. City
of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 426-27, 542 P.2d 371, 375 (1975). If judicial review is
sought under Rule 106, review must be sought within 30 days of the challenged decision.
On the other hand, if a land use decision is legislative in character, judicial review may be
sought outside Rule 106 and the plaintiff may have several years to commence an action.
If the plaintiff eventually prevails, the developer cannot claim a vested right under the
statute, because the VPR is subject to judicial review. The statute expressly provides that
adoption of a development agreement is a legislative act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68104(2) (Supp. 1987). The Snyder criteria for a quasi-judicial action-are: (i) a state or local

law requiring that the decision-maker give notice to the community before acting; (2) a
state or local law requiring that the decision-maker conduct a public hearing, pursuant to
notice, and allowing the public an opportunity to be heard, and (3) a state or local law
requiring that the decision-maker reach a determination by applying facts to criteria established by law. Id. at 374. The approval of most site specific development plans should
satisfy these criteria.
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(3) (Supp. 1987).
207. Id. at § 24-68-103(1).
208. Id. at § 24-68-103(2).
209. Id. at § 24-68-105(1).
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tions to this rule. First, the local government can take a zoning or land
use action that alters, impairs or delays the project if the landowner consents to the action. 2 10 Second, the local government can take a zoning
or land use action if the action is necessary to correct a man-made or
natural hazard that would pose a serious threat to the public health,
safety or welfare and the hazard could not reasonably have been discovered at the time the plan was approved. 2 1 ' Third, the local government
can take a zoning or land use action that impacts the project as long as
the landowner receives just compensation for all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred after the local government's approval of the site specific
development plan. 2 12 While the compensation scheme includes reim-

bursement for all architectural, planning, marketing, legal and other
consultant fees, it does not include any diminution in the value of the
landowner's property. 213 Finally, the local government may enact ordinances or regulations that are general in nature and applicable to all
properties subject to land use regulation without paying just compensation, even though these ordinances or regulations alter, impair or delay
2 14
the development or use of the property for which a VPR is claimed.
Examples of these regulations include building, fire, plumbing, electri2 15
cal and mechanical codes.
Under the statute, a VPR acquired while one local government has
jurisdiction over the property, in whole or in part, is good "against any
other local government which may subsequently obtain or assert jurisdiction over such property. ' 2 16 This section would apply most often
when a local government annexes property for which a VPR exists. It is
possible, however, that a municipality could condition any agreement to
2 17
annex property on the owner's waiver of his VPR.

The statute expressly provides that statutory vested rights exist in
addition to whatever vested property right might exist at common
law. 2 18 The statute does not modify the common law regarding claims
that a compensable taking has occurred. 2 19 The first provision sh6uldhave no real impact on the law, but the second provision may be rele22 0
vant to a claim for damages alleging that a taking of property.
Senate Bill No. 219 became effective on January 1, 1988.221 The
statute makes no mention of the need for the adoption of any local law
to implement the vesting scheme. Apparently, any land use application
210. Id.at (1)(a).
211. Id.at (1)(b).
212. Id.at (1)(c).

213. Id.
214. Id.at (2).

215. Id.
216. Id. at § 24-68-106(2).
217. See Groy & Shultz, Negotiating a Successful Annexation Agreement, 39 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIGEST 3, 6-7 (1987).
218. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-106(3) (Supp. 1987).

219. Id.
220. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
221.

COLO. REV. STAT.

§

24-68-106(4) (Supp. 1987).

19881

VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

approved on or after January 1, 1988, which is reasonably certain as to
the type and intensity of use carries with it a VPR.
3.

"How Could We Go So Wrong When We Were So Sincere?"

One could suggest that S.B. 219 was ill-conceived from the beginning. The law totally changes the normal order of things - that the
rights of a property owner are always subject to the reasonably exercised
police power. 2 22 Moreover, an owner of property, at common law, had
no right to make any specific use of his or her property. Instead, the
owner had only a right to a reasonable or beneficial use. 223 As the
as a matter
courts have stated consistently, no property owner is entitled
2 24
of law to the highest and best use of his or her property.
A legislative body is free to modify common law notions of property
rights. Although it is not clear whether a legislature may diminish a
property right on which there has been no reliance beyond some constitutionally protected minimum, it is clear that a legislature may enlarge
rights that are incidental to property ownership. Senate Bill No. 219
greatly enlarges the rights of property owners by establishing the right
"to undertake and complete the development and use of property under
22 5
the terms and conditions of a site specific development plan."
No state has a law that goes as far as Colorado's S.B. 219. A handful
of states vest development rights following preliminary or final plat approval,2 2 6 but even then, only as to certain additional regulations. By
far, the majority of states require some form of detrimental reliance by a
property owner before a development right will vest. 2 27 Senate Bill No.
219, as suggested in the legislative findings, 228 enhances business certainty by eliminating any need for detrimental reliance before a development right will vest.
222. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 369, 395 (1926) (holding that a zoning
restriction is invalid if it is arbitrary and unreasonable with no substantial relationship to
public health, safety or the general welfare). The Supreme Court eventually replaced this
"substantial relationship" test with the "rational relationship" test normally applied to
socio-economic regulation. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6
(1977); see also Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 321, 483 P.2d 953, 955 (1971);
Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 347, 255 P. 443, 446 (1927). Most recently,
however, the Court revived the substantial relationship test for land use regulations which
exact a property interest from the landowner as a condition for a land use approval or
permit. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987).
223. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1233, 1242
(1987) (a taking may be found where a regulation denies an owner all economically viable
use of his land).
224. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395-97 (explaining that landowner was not entitled to
commercial use of property simply because that use has a higher value than residential
use); Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 322, 482 P.2d 953, 956 (1971) (owner not
entitled to highest use of property).
225. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(5) (Supp. 1987).
226. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
228. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-101(a) (Supp. 1987) states: "It is necessary and desirable, as a matter of public policy, to provide for the establishment of vested property rights
in order to ensure reasonable certainty, stability, and fairness in the land use planning
process and in order to stimulate economic growth ... "
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There are at least three reasons why S.B. 219 unreasonably favors
the development industry. First, land use regulatory processes are often
a system for mediating the inevitable disputes between property developers and their so-called "neighbors. ' 2 29 The officials who implement
the regulatory process must attempt to balance the legitimate and competing expectations of developers and neighbors. Yet frequently, neighbors are not fully informed about land use applications and are
unconcerned about development until there is some visible sign that development is about to take place. 2 30 Under the common law, the protests of neighbors will be both too little and too late if the developer
who has obtained a land use approval has reasonably relied on the approval to its detriment. If reasonable and detrimental reliance does not
exist, the neighbors might have an impact on a previously approved
231
project.
Senate Bill No. 219 drastically changes the dynamics of the land use
regulatory process. If neighbors are unable to come together and effectively challenge a land use application when the government first considers a developer's proposal, the neighbors may have lost their only
opportunity to insist that the developer mitigate the impact of the pro2 32
ject on the community.
A second flaw of S.B. 219 is its insistence that the government pay
just compensation to a landowner when the government interferes with
a VPR because of "natural or man-made hazards on or in the immediate
vicinity of the subject property" 2 33 unless the "hazards could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of site specific development
plan approval, and which hazards, if uncorrected, would pose a serious
threat to the public health, safety, and welfare ....,1234 In other words,
if a development project is determined to pose a "serious threat" to
neighboring property owners or to future residents of the project itself,
the government cannot interfere with the development if the problem
229. The term "neighbors" refers to persons in the community, other than the landowner who propose to develop his or her property. The opinions of neighbors have always played a substantial role in land use decisionmaking. See Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d
671 (Mo. App. 1972) (discussing legitimate interests of neighbors in land use approval
processes). But courts can hold that the government may not turn the land use decision
making process into a plebiscite on the neighborhood opinion. See Taco Bell v. City of
Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 879 P.2d 133 (1984).

The Colorado Supreme Court held that

neighbors, in the ordinary sense, do not have vested rights in a zoning ordinance that
would restrict the government's rezoning of another person's property. See Spiker v. City of

Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528, 532-33, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (1979).
230. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 668-69.
231. See, e.g., William C. Haas v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (concerning a protracted legal battle between a
developer and neighbors).
232. In essence, S.B. 219 creates a form of collateral estoppel for land use decisions
that prevents neighbors, to a limited extent, from attacking an approved development proposal in another forum. Neighbors are free to seek judicial review of the land use approval. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7
(rev. ed. 1926) (permitting judicial review at the request of persons aggrieved by zoning
decisions). See also CoLo. R. Civ. PROC. 106(a)(4).
233. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1987).

234. Id.
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should have been discovered at the time the government approved the
site specific development plan. However, the government can pay just
compensation to the landowner. 23 5 This legal limitation creates a difficult dilemma for the government. The government is unlikely to compensate a property owner for what could amount to several hundred
thousand dollars of work if it interferes with a VPR. 2 3 6 But the cost
would be a liability to neighbors or future residents of the project due to
the government's failure to interfere with the project. 23

7

Given current

economic conditions, it is unlikely that the government will interfere
with the VPR, merely hoping that the gods will look favorably upon its
decision.
Senate Bill No. 219 also creates the difficult problem of determining
when a natural or man-made hazard could reasonably have been discovered, presumably by the government. 238 This limitation on the right of
the government to interfere with a VPR should not be applied strictly by
a court when the developer has not incurred the type of reasonable and
detrimental reliance that would vest a development right at common
law. Similarly, a court should not read the phrase "serious threat" as
requiring proof by the government that the threat is life-threatening or
more likely than not to occur. The interference with development
projects, even for public health and safety reasons, imposes costs on developers. Furthermore, those costs often can be internalized and spread
235. Id.
236. At common law, expenditures will not necessarily vest a development right. If the
costs are incurred for preparatory work or are small relative to the overall cost of a project,
the development right will not vest. See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 49, at 226-29.
237. See Eschette v. City of New Orleans, 245 So. 2d 383 (La. 1971) (holding local
government liable for failure to enact sufficiently stringent subdivision regulations, which
resulted in damage to neighbors of subdivision); compare Barney's Furniture Warehouse of
Newark v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 303 A.2d 76 (1973) (holding that the city lacked a
duty towards plaintiffs to impose specific subdivision improvement requirements on developer). Several courts have refused to hold governments liable when land use decisions
caused injury to neighbors of a development on the grounds of immunity for the exercise
of a discretionary, governmental function. See, e.g., Panepinto v. Edmart, Inc., 129 N.J.
Super. 319, 323 A.2d 533 (App. Div. 1974). Whether neighbors of or residents in a development project could bring an action against the local government depends on application
of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 to -118
(1982 & Supp. 1987). Generally, the act immunizes a local government from claims in
tort, id. at § 24-10-105, unless the claim involves certain exempted areas in which the government may be liable, id. at § 24-10-106. Even then, a plaintiff must comply with certain
notification requirements or forfeit its claim. See Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d
1042, 1046 (Colo. App. 1987); compare Franks v. City of Aurora, 147 Colo. 25, 362 P.2d
561 (1961) (neighbors brought an action against Aurora due to flood damage allegedly
caused by undersized drainage culvert installed by private developer pursuant to plans
issued by city engineer-the City settled).
238. Section 24-68-105(l)(b) is ambiguous as to who should have reasonably discovered the hazard. Presumably, the government may not interfere with the right if it reasonably should have discovered the hazard. The government normally relies on data that the
land use applicant submits in support of its application, thus the government will argue
that the hazard was not reasonably discoverable because the applicant failed to submit
sufficient data. In addition, if the government should have realized that a hazard existed,
the government should not be prohibited from interfering with the VPR if the applicant
was not forthcoming and withheld data from the government that would have made the
hazard even more apparent. Compare Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Colo. App. 1985) (estoppel not available to developer who acts wrongly).
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among the various consumers of the development industry's products.
This cost shifting technique is superior to forcing the government to put
a segment of the population at risk because of its fiscal austerity or a
court's anti-government reading of S.B. 219.239
The third problem with S.B. 219 is the likelihood that S.B. 219 will
promote the warehousing of property. Under the statute, property owners will want to bring as much land within the size specific development
plan as possible in order to gain protection from subsequent changes in
the law. 2 40 A developer will include excess land in a site specific development plan, even if the land is unlikely to be developed within the
three-year vesting period. Unfortunately, the "terms and conditions" by
which a site specific development plan is approved could become obsolete within three years. Apart from differing land use control philosophies, there are two major reasons for the obsolescence: (1) planning
and engineering principles change and (2) conditions within the community change. An example of the first reason is a determination, when
the slope of land increases, that the density of development should be
reduced even more than previously believed. 24 1 Senate Bill No. 219
prevents a rezoning to reduce density for all land within the site specific
development plan, regardless of whether a rezoning was part of the approval process. 24 2 An example of the second reason is a determination
that other development occurring subsequent to approval of a site specific deyelopment plan has had a greater impact on community services
2 43
and facilities than was previously expected.
Where to draw the line between flexibility and certainty is a political
question. The Colorado legislature drew the line far to the side of cer239. Compare Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). The
Utah Supreme Court held that a developer acquired a vested property right when he filed
a substantially conforming plan for a building permit or subdivision plat approval while
there was no notice that a change in the law was pending and if the change in the law was
not necessary to protect public health and safety. Thus, even in ajurisdiction that adopts a
very pro-landowner vesting rule, the court will not vest a right when public health and
safety militates against the vesting, at least when there is no detrimental reliance. Senate
Bill No. 219 arguably codifies Colorado common law by vesting a right when the government should have known about hazards associated with the project. See, e.g., Williams v.
Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). The common law rule, that would vest a right
when the government should have known about a hazard, included the requirement that
the landowner demonstrate detrimental reliance.
240. See generally M. Shultz & J. Groy, The Premature Subdivision of Land in Colorado: A
Study with Commentary, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass., Monograph 8610 (1986) (DISCUSSING EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF PREMATURE CONVERSION OF LAND TO RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT).
241. See L. KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING

39 (1980) (showing relationship between
slope and need for additional open space within boundaries of property). Governments
are increasingly adopting ordinances to regulate hillside development for health, safety
and aesthetic reasons. See Sellon v. City of Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229 (Colo. 1987)
(en banc) (upholding hillside development ordinance).
242. Although existing zoning may not be the basis for claiming a VPR, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-68-103(2) (Supp. 1987), once the VPR is established, the government may not
interfere with the VPR by rezoning the property to which it attaches. Id. at § 24-68-105(1).
243. Generally, local governments may deny land use approvals due to a lack of available community services or facilities. The leading case in support of this proposition is
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).

1
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tainty. Unfortunately, the statute raises numerous issues that will need
to be resolved by amendment or litigation. To the extent that developers, local government officials, and neighbors do not know how a court
might resolve the ambiguities in S.B. 219, certainty will remain elusive.
The courts or the legislature will need to address the following issues.
4.

Is S.B. 219 a Mandatory or an Enabling Statute?

Senate Bill No. 219 appears, at first, to be a self-executing scheme
for creating vested property rights. The statute defines a vested property
right and links that right with approval of a site specific development. If
the statute mandated the types of land use that constitute a site specific
development plan, there would be little or no reason for local government action.

24 4

Instead, the statute appears to allow each local government to determine what will constitute a site specific development plan. Section
24-68-102(4) of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides that a site specific development is a plan that describes "with reasonable certainty the
' 24 5
type and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property.
Ambiguity is created by the next sentence of the section which reads in
244. If one reads S.B. 219 with the understanding that it establishes a vested property
right as a matter of state law without reference to local law, one may interpret section 2468-102(4) as follows:
I. A site specific development plan is one that is reasonably certain as to type
and intensity of use;
2. A number of land use plans and approvals may be site specific development
plans and, in fact, will be ifthey meet the two criteria for a site specific development plan;
3. Because local governments use different types of plans or approvals, what
finally constitutes a site specific development shall be determined by the government on a case by case basis as it approves land use applications by ordinance or regulation or when it enters into a development agreement;
4. If the government creates a vested right by entering into a development
agreement, the document evidencing the agreement shall be designated by
the government at the time of its approval.
This view of S.B. 219 leaves no room for local discretion regarding establishment of a VPR
except as one may be established by the development agreement. In all other circumstances, when the government approves a land use plan or application by ordinance or
regulation, assuming public notice and a hearing, and the plan or approval is reasonably
certain as to the type and the intensity of use, a VPR is established as a matter of state law
notwithstanding the local government's desires. Ifthis is the correct interpretation of S.B.
219, the law is even more draconian than it appears at first glance. A court must interpret
S.B. 219 to provide local governments some latitude in designating land use plans or approvals that constitute site specific development plans. Local administration is allowed too
much discretion in regulating land by imposing a state law scheme that operates irrespective of local law. Since an interpretation, not based on plain meaning, of S.B. 219 would
be to preclude any meaningful role by local governments to establish a VPR, a court
should base the reading of the statute on the policy implications of the various reasonable
interpretations of the statute.
Apparently, Governor Romer believes that S.B. 219 allows for local discretion in determining what constitutes a site specific development plan. Letter from Governor Roy
Romer to Colorado State Senate (August 27, 1987). Governor Romer indicated that he
signed S.B. 219 because it included language which allows local governments to have the
final determination on what plans or approvals will vest the right. The Governor, however, may have overestimated the impact of the sentence that was added to S.B. 219 following the Governor's veto of S.B. 60.
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
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part: "[sluch plan may be in the form of, but need not be limited to, any
of the following plans or approvals .... "246 The section then lists ten
specific land use approvals in addition to "any other land use approval
designation as may be utilized by a local government" that may consti2 47
tute a site specific development plan.

At this point, it may appear that the types of plans and approvals
listed in section 24-68-102(4) not only may, but will, be a site specific
development plan when the plan or approval relates to the type and intensity of use for a parcel or parcels, at least if the type and intensity of
development are described with "reasonable certainty" in the plan or
approval. The better interpretation is that no specific land use plan or
approval needs to constitute a site specific development plan unless the
local government determines that the plan or approval will constitute a
site specific development plan. Section 24-68-102(4) is clear on this:
"What constitutes a site specific development plan under this article that
would trigger a vested property right shall be finally determined by the
local government either pursuant to ordinance, regulation or upon an
agreement entered into by the local government and the landowner
"248

In light of the local government's discretion to determine which
plans or approvals will constitute a site specific development plan, S.B.
219 appears merely to enable a local government to adopt a vesting ordinance or regulation. Even assuming that the local government is
obliged to refer to the statutory definition of site specific development
when determining whether a plan or approval is within that definition,
S.B. 219 allows local government the ultimate decision. 2 49 At most,
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. This section, which purports only to define a site specific development plan, is
extremely unclear. The ordinance or regulation referred to in the section may mean one
of general applicability which establishes local government policy, or it may mean every
ordinance or regulation relating to a development plan or approval that describes the type
and intensity of development with reasonable certainty. The term "certainty" itself is ambiguous. "Certainty" implies predictability whereas the intent of the section appears to
connote "certainty" as "specificity."
249. The ambiguity of S.B. 219 is again present in one sentence of section 24-68102(4) which provides that "[wihat constitutes a site specific development plan.., shall be
finally determined by the local government .
The sentence may be interpreted four
different ways:
1. On a case by case basis, the government must ("shall") determine that a land
use plan or approval constitutes a site specific development plan if the plan or
approval describes with reasonable certainty the type and intensity of development. This determination is subject to judicial review;
2. On the basis of an ordinance or regulation of general application, the local
government must ("shall") determine that its land use approvals and required development plans, which describe with reasonable certainty the type
and intensity of development, are site specific development plans. This determination is subject to judicial review;
3. On a case-by-case basis, the government may exercise final discretion and
shall determine whether a specific land use plan or approval constitutes a site
specific development plan. This determination could possibly be reviewed
only to evaluate whether the government acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
determining that a land use plan or approval does or does not constitute a
site specific development plan because of the degree of certainty with which
the type and intensity of development are described in the plan or approval;
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S.B. 219 might require a local government to designate one land use
plan or one land use approval as a site specific development plan.
If a local government is obligated to designate one or more land use
plans or approvals as a site specific development plan, a related issue is
whether a property owner may waive his or her claim to a VPR. 2 5 0 For
example, if the local government determines that final subdivision plat
approval constitutes a site specific development plan, the government
may grant final plat approval only if the property owner waives any claim
to the VPR. Assuming that local governments must recognize site specific development plans, which by statute create vested property rights,
it is illogical to believe that the government always could withhold approval of a land use application unless the property owner waived any
claim to a VPR. Similarly, the government should not be permitted to
withhold approval of land use applications unless the landowner waives
the right to argue that the government reasonably could have discovered a hazard associated with development at the time of approval.
Logically a local government could, on a case-by-case basis, determine that certain specific land use approvals should not create a VPR
because of hazards associated with a given development project. Thus,
for example, a rezoning to residential use may create a VPR generally,
but the government may refuse to rezone property in a floodplain to
25 1
residential use unless the property owner waives any claim to a VPR.
Even here, the government might need to retain the power to deny approval for public health and safety reasons.
4.

On the basis of an ordinance or regulation of general application, the government shall determine by the exercise of its discretion, which is final, which of
its land use approvals or required development plans will constitute site specific development plans. This ordinance or regulation could possibly be reviewed only to determine whether the government acted unreasonably in
determining that a specific land use approval process or plan does or does
not constitute a site specific development plan.
250. See letter from Governor Roy Romer to Colorado State Senate (August 27, 1987).
In his letter, Governor Romer stated that when he vetoed the predecessor of S.B. 219
(S.B. 60), he suggested that express language be included in a revised bill authorizing the
waiver of a VPR. Waiver should be possible only when the government offers to waive
certain conditions that it could impose on the developer in exchange for the developer's
waiver of any claim to a VPR. This issue relates to whether the local government has
discretion in designating plans or approvals which constitute site specific development
plans. If the local government really does have complete or substantial discretion, waiver
is irrelevant because the government may refuse to designate a specific plan or approval as
a site specific development plan and avoid establishment of a VPR altogether. See Memorandum from Gerald E. Dahl to Municipal Officials at 1 (September 28, 1987) (discussing
waiver of vested rights).
251. The government will be on safer ground if it either (1) adopts an ordinance or
regulation of general application that excludes plans or approvals involving hazardous
sites from the definition of site specific development plans, or (2) amends existing zoning,
subdivision or other land use approvals to limit a landowner's ability to develop property
involving natural or man-made hazards. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (upholding restrictions on coal mining to prevent
subsidence). The government also should be free to agree to waive certain conditions that
it lawfully could impose on a development in exchange for the developer's waiver of any
claim to a vested right. The waivers should logically relate to one another. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (suggesting that land use regulations
may not be used as a system of extortion).
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What is the Effect of a VPR on Subsequent Land Use Approval and Permit
Processes?

A superficial reading of S.B. 219 would infer that a development,
for which the government has approved a site specific development
plan, cannot be subjected to any regulation enacted subsequent to the
establishment of the VPR if the regulation "would alter, impair, prevent,
diminish, or otherwise delay the development or use of the property as
set forth in the site specific development plan ....-252 There can be no
doubt that a VPR does not entitle a property owner to additional land
use approvals or permits unless the owner meets the conditions for
those approvals or permits that existed at the time the VPR was
253
established.
More importantly, a VPR does not immunize a development project
from the effect of regulations enacted after the establishment of the VPR
if the regulations do not relate to the "terms and conditions" of the site
specific development plan. 2 54 For example, the terms and conditions of
252. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987).
253. For example, if a landowner subdivides a five-acre tract into five one-acre lots
pursuant to a government approved plat, the landowner has no vested right to have the
property rezoned to residential use. Rather, the landowner must prove to the zoning
board that a change in use is proper. This proof of necessity for rezoning is required, if
for no other reason, because subdivision and zoning are two different land use regulatory
processes and the terms and conditions of subdivision approval do not deal with the type
of use permitted for a piece of property. See Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528,
532, 603 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo. 1979) ("Although zoning changes and plat approvals may
be conjoined, they are essentially separate and distinct matters.") A more difficult question is whether the government may rezone the property following plat approval. See infra
notes 240-41 and accompanying text. Senate Bill No. 219 provides that the local government plan exists to determine its compliance with the terms and conditions of approval.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104 (3) (Supp. 1987).

254. The phrase "terms and conditions" used in section 24-68-102(5) is ambiguous, as
demonstrated by New Jersey case law. At one time, New Jersey state law provided that
tentative approval of a subdivision plat assured the developer that the government could
not change "terms and conditions" upon which approval was granted for three years from
the date of approval. See Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N.J. 570, 574, 174 A.2d 465,469 (1961)
(discussing statute). In a series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that
"minimum lot size" was a term or condition of tentative plat approval. Id. On the other
hand, the court held that paving requirements, Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J.
500, 509, 173 A.2d 391, 400 (1961), the existence of sidewalks, and the width of streets,
Pennyton Homes v. Planning Bd., 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d 870, 872 (1964), were not terms
and conditions of approval, and therefore the government could alter those requirements
after tentative approval. The fact that a VPR is not created when a local government approves a sketch or preliminary subdivision plat,see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp.
1987), does not negate the fact that courts will need to determine what constitutes the
"terms and conditions" of each site specific development plan.
Unfortunately, the issue regarding the scope of the VPR is even more confusing because of the inconsistency between the definition of a VPR, which relates to a right to
develop and use property in accordance with the "terms and conditions" of the site specific development plan, Id. at § 24-68-102(5), and the effect of a VPR, which prevents a
government from interfering with the development or use of property subject to a VPR
"as set forth in a site specific development plan." Id. at § 24-68-105(l). A site specific
development plan might "set forth" matters that were not necessarily considered the local
government during its approval of the plan and therefore should not be considered part of
the "terms and conditions" of the plan. To the extent that section 24-68-102(5) defines a
VPR, it should control the scope of the VPR and the correlative duty of the local
government.
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final subdivision plat approval may include the right of the subdivider to
use individual sewage disposal systems in the subdivision. However, the
terms and conditions may not include any criteria relating to the design
standards for the individual sewage disposal systems. 25 5 Although the
local government could not refuse to allow the individual systems after
final plat approval, the government should be able to require the subdivider to comply with local regulations which existed when an application
was submitted. The local government should also be able to require
compliance with regulations which are amended subsequent to the establishment of the VPR. The enforcement of amended regulations
would not affect the "development or use of the property as set forth in
a site specific development plan" unless the plan contained the design
standards for individual sewage disposal systems.
In addition, the statute prohibits any change in zoning or land use
except where "the application of ordinances or regulations which are
general in nature and are applicable to all property subject to land use
regulation by a local government.' '256 Although the section lists only
building, fire, plumbing, electrical and mechanical codes, the section
should be read to include any other ordinance or regulation that does
not deal on a site specific basis with property for which a site specific
development plan exists.

257

255. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-10-101 to -112 (1982 & Supp. 1987). It should not
matter whether the local government had regulations regarding individual sewage disposal
systems in place at the time that the government approved the site specific development
plan. The developer should be subject to regulations, whether existing before or after
establishment of the VPR, so long as the regulations do not involve the "terms and conditions" of the site specific development plan. It is unreasonable, for example, to argue that
a term or condition of approval is that a landowner does not have to conduct an environmental impact assessment ("EIS") when the government has no regulations concerning an
EIS. If, however, the government imposes an EIS as a condition precedent to issuance of a
building permit, the landowner who claims a VPR should be required to perform the EIS.
Compare Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1980) (holding
that a landowner could be subject to regulations pending adoption at the time he or she
submits a conforming land use application if the owner is aware of the regulation); see also
Crittenden v. McPherson, 585 P.2d 928, 929 (Colo. App. 1978) (county could deny liquor
license application pending at time when government rezoned subject property so long as
there was no undue delay in acting on the application). It is worthwhile to note that a
landowner has no right under S.B. 219 to request its land use application be reviewed
under only those regulations in effect at the date of the application.
256. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(2). One may wonder if rezoning, accomplished by
an amendment to the zoning ordinance text, would be within this provision. Although the
amendment may prohibit a previously permitted use in a certain zoning district, such
amendment will have a general application since it will apply to all property within the
zoning district for which the applicable regulations have been amended. In other words,
the textual change is not really a site specific rezoning.
257. There are two state statutes enabling local governments to regulate land use that
are in possible conflict with S.B. 219. The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling
Act ("LUCEA"), CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-101 to -107 (1986), adopted by the Colorado
legislature in 1974 when the land use control pendulum was in a different position, generally empowers local governments to regulate land use for a number of specific reasons in
addition to "[o]therwise planning for and regulating the use of land and protection of the
environment in a manner consistent with constitutional rights." Id. at §§ 29-20-104(a)-(h).
It remains to be seen whether regulations adopted pursuant to LUCEA are exempt under
S.B. 219. The Colorado Supreme Court limited the apparent breadth of LUCEA in Pennobscott, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 642 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1982) (state enabling
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Apart from the horizontal vesting question, 2 58 there is the question
of the effect of a VPR on state or regional land use approval processes
(vertical vesting). The statute only vests a development right against
interference by a local government. Section 24-68-102(2) defines local
government in a way that cannot be read to include any state or regional
land use approval process. 2 59 For example, an owner's development
right is not vested against changes in state regulations under the federal
Safe Drinking Water Act. 2 6 0 Similarly, a development right should not
be vested against regulations that the Colorado Land Use Commission
may adopt.

C.

26 1

What is the Scope of Government Liability for Interference with a VPR?

The scope of a local government's liability for interference with a
VPR is uncertain under S.B. 219. The statute does not directly address
the question of liability if a local government interferes with a VPR;
rather, the statute allows for local government interference with a VPR
provided "the affected landowner receives just compensation for all
costs, expenses, and liabilities incurred by the landowner" after the government approved the site specific development plan. 26 2 The payment

ofjust compensation appears, from the statute, to be a condition precedent to the government's right to interfere with the VPR. Assuming the
likelihood that the government may not pay just compensation prior to
interference with a VPR, the question is whether the landowner is entitled to damages or injunctive relief.
If governmental interference with a VPR constitutes a "taking" of
statute limiting county subdivision control to divisions creating parcels under 35 acres also
limited LUCEA).
The second statute of general application is the Areas and Activities of State Interest
Law. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The act encourages
local governments to designate areas and activities of state interest and to administer these
areas and regulate these activities after designation. Id. at § 24-65.1-101(2)(b). Areas of
state interest include natural hazard areas, areas containing or having a significant impact
on historical, natural or archeological resources of statewide importance and areas around
key facilities in which development may have a material effect on the facility or the surrounding community. Id. at § 24-65.1-201. Activities of state interest include, among
others, site selection and construction of major new domestic water and sewage treatment
systems and major extensions of existing systems and site selection and development of
new communities. Id. at § 2 4 -65.1-203(1)(a), (b) & (g). Although this statute does not
appear to come within the exemption provided in section 24-68-105(2) of S.B. 219, a court
should exercise caution before holding that a landowner is vested against regulations
adopted pursuant to a statute that is predicated on matters of statewide interest to the
same extent as S.B. 219.
258. Horizontal vesting refers to the effect that detrimental reliance has on an approval
from one agency of the local government to other agencies at the same level of that local
government.
259. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(2) (Supp. 1987) states: "Local government means
any county, city and county, city, or town, whether statutory or home rule, acting through
its governing body or any board, commission, or agency thereof having final approval
authority over a site specific development plan, including without limitation, any legally
empowered urban renewal authority."
260. See id. at § 25-1-107(1)(x)(I) (1982).
261. See id. at § 24-65-104(2) (1987).
262. Id. at § 2 4-68-105(I)(c) (Supp. 1987).
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property, a property owner is not entitled, at least as a matter of federal
constitutional law, to enjoin the taking. 2 63 The owner may merely be
2 64
entitled to just compensation, as required by the fifth amendment.
The government may pay just compensation after the taking rather than
26 5
Of
prior to the taking without violating the federal Constitution.
course, state law may impose different limitations on the power of the
government to interfere with property rights and a court. For example,
state law may dictate that the local government's failure to pay just compensation to the property owner, whose VPR has been interfered with,
entitles the owner to sue for damages, including all incidental and con2 66
sequential damages.
When the VPR is established pursuant to a development agreement, 26 7 the local government may have increased its exposure to a
claim for damages. A development agreement is a contract between the
property owner and the government, 26 8 and if the government breaches
the contract, it may be burdened by more than just statutory liability.
To avoid paying more than the damages enumerated in the statute, the
local government will need to convince a court that the statutory measure of damages is meant to be exclusive. The government should be
free to enforce the provision in the development agreement which limits
its liability to the damages specified in section 24-68-105(1)(c).

26 9

Senate Bill No. 219 creates the possibility which requires a local
government to pay just compensation to an owner who is liable for a
public nuisance. 2 70 Such a result would not be required even under the
expanding "takings" jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. 2 7 1 As the Court stated, no person can acquire a vested right to
263. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932). The Supreme Court recently extended the rule that the
owner of property that is taken for a public purpose, is entitled as a matter of law to just
compensation and not injunctive relief for local regulations that "go too far." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2388 (1987).
264. See supra note 39.
265. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194, (1985) (federal constitution does not require that just compensation be paid in
advance of or contemporaneously with taking).
266. See supra note 223 (regarding local government immunity in Colorado). As an
alternative, a landowner may seek relief from the district court if the government action
that interferes with a VPR is quasi-judicial in nature and the action exceeds the local government's authority. See CoLo. R. CIv. PROC. 106(a)(4) (Supp. 1987); see also Snyder v. City
of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975) (dealing generally with Rule 106 relief
against a rezoning of property); Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo.
360, 360, 520 P.2d 738, 742 (1974) (discussing available damages in inverse condemnation action).
267. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
268. See generally Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. REv.
957, 995-1003 (1987) (providing a detailed treatment of the proper characterization of
development agreements and arguing that they are as much regulatory in nature as
contractual).
269. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
270. For a discussion of public nuisance law, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 88 (1971).
271. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245-1246
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maintain a nuisance. 2 72 Under S.B. 219, the government will be forced
to pay just compensation to a property owner who engages in a nuisance
if the government reasonably should have known at the time of approval
of the site specific development plan that the owner's intended use
would constitute a nuisance. 2 73 For example, a government may approve an application to operate a landfill only to discover later that the
landfill constitutes a public nuisance. It is unfair that the government
could terminate the landfill three years and one day after the establishment of the VPR without payment of just compensation. However, the
government could not interfere with the completion of the landfill project during the three year vesting period unless it paid just compensa274
tion as defined in S.B. 219 to the property owner.
Another interesting issue with respect to the scope of local governmental liability is whether a local government must pay just compensation when it interferes with a VPR, pursuant to the mandate of state or
federal law. For example, the federal government could require a local
government to adopt regulations respecting clean air, and the regulations would apply to the property subject to a VPR. 2 75 It would be unconscionable to require the local government to pay out of its pocket
just compensation to a property owner only because the local government was forced to enact regulations under the mandate of state or federal law.
A final issue on local government liability relates to the receipt of a
windfall by the property owner if the government tries to "alter, impair,
prevent, diminish, or otherwise delay the development or use of the
property." '2 76 If a regulation enacted subsequent to the establishment
of the VPR delays the completion of the affected development for one
day, section 24-68-105(l)(c) requires the government to pay "just compensation" for all of the property owner's expenses which were incurred
following establishment of the VPR. 2 7 7 "Just compensation" is a legal
term of art and generally refers to fair market value. 2 78 Thus, the government would appear to be liable for the fair market value of all "costs,
n.22 (1987) (rejecting the landowner's argument for a right to compensation when government interferes with nuisance or nuisance-like activities).
272. See id. at 1245 n.20 ("no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a
nuisance or otherwise harm others").
273. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
274. Senate Bill No. 219 appears to prohibit a change in use of property, to which a
VPR attaches, for three years even if development of the property is completed in a much
shorter time. Id. at § 24-68-102(5) (Supp. 1987) (VPR "means the right to undertake and
complete the development and use of property"). This interpretation may be correct, for
an owner may not develop his or her property following establishment of a VPR. Thus,
the VPR protects the "use."
275. The failure of the government to enact regulations to come into compliance with
federal air and water quality standards could cause the state or local government to lose
federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7616 (1982) (federal grant programs for air quality
control and sewers).
276. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987).
277. Id. at § 24-68-105(l)(c).
278. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,
CONTROL LAw

610 (2d ed. 1986).
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expenses, and liabilities incurred by the landowner" after establishment
of the VPR even though the extent of government's interference with
the VPR is negligible.
A court should read "just compensation" (as used in S.B. 219) as
meaning something other than "fair market value." The application of
the term fair market value is out of context of payment for all "costs,
expenses, and liabilities" incurred by the landowner. Within the context
of section 24-68-105,279 'just compensation" should denote an amount
of money that is reasonably related to the extent of the government's
interference with a VPR. For example, a local government should not
be required to pay all of the landowner's costs, expenses, and liabilities
when the government reduces the allowable density of the development
project, unless the developer can demonstrate that the development
project would not have been undertaken at the reduced density. Instead, a court should determine what constitutes a fairportion of costs,
expenses, and liabilities for which the government should compensate
280
the landowner.
D.

What Standards Will Guide a Court Seeking to Resolve Conflicts Involving
Development Agreements?

Four states other than Colorado have adopted development agreement statutes by enacting a relatively comprehensive scheme to guide
local governments entering into a development agreement. 28 ' Presumably, the statutory schemes and legislative histories, where they exist,
can provide standards to guide a court when resolving disputes in this
area. Colorado, by contrast, has two sentences of text regarding devel282
opment agreements.
There are several issues that may be litigated with respect to development agreements. First, S.B. 219 does not establish a maximum time
period for which a development right will be vested pursuant to the
agreement. The statute only provides that the normal three year period
may be exceded if the landowner and government enter into the agreement. Since a development agreement is included within the examples
of site specific development plans, 28 3 and a VPR resulting from ap28 4
proval of a site specific development plan lasts only for three years,
the agreement may extend the original vesting period by a maximum of
only three years. This argument necessarily assumes that the development agreement must be used in conjunction with some other plan or
approval that constitutes a site specific development plan, otherwise the
279. COLO. REV. STAT. 24-68-105.
280. This argument is supported by the statutory language that the government may
interfere with the VPR "[t]o the extent" that it pays just compensation. COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 24-68-105(1)(c) (Supp. 1987).
281. See supra note 119.
282. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987).
283. Id. at § 24-68-102(1).
284. Id. at § 24-68-104(1).
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agreement standing alone would vest a right for the basic three year
period only.
Unless S.B. 219 limits the time period for which a development
agreement can vest a development right, local governments are free
under the statute to vest a right in property for eternity. This possibility
raises a constitutional question: may a local government agree never to
adopt a regulation that will interfere with a landowner's property interests? The answer is no. Under the reserved powers doctrine, no legislative body may agree by contract to refraii from exercising its legislative
powers. 2 85 Several courts have limited the effect of the reserved powers
doctrine to a total abdication of power by the government and thus have
upheld agreements that limited the exercise of legislative power for a
reasonable period of time.2 86 It is not certain what a Colorado court
28 7
would consider a reasonable period of time to be.
A second potential issue for litigation is the permissible purpose for
which a local government may enter into a development agreement.
The development agreement originally was viewed as a method to protect phased developments from government interference. 288 The
agreement was necessary because common law vesting rules did not
protect future phases of a development for which present development
did not create a vested right. In a number of jurisdictions, dealmaking
has replaced strict adherence to statutory procedures and standards for
land use approvals. 289 Thus, local governments may treat each development application as a new business opportunity. The government approves the land use application, waives certain procedural or substantive
requirements, and vests the development for some period of time, all in
exchange for the developer's contract to provide certain benefits to the
government. The benefits usually include constructing or paying for
off-site improvements or by setting aside units in a residential develop2 90
ment for middle to low-income persons.
Senate Bill No. 219 does not specify the purposes for which the
285. See Wegner, supra note 268, at 965-68 and 965 n.30.
286. See e.g., Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasonton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 130
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976); City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W. 2d 288 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
287. Cf Geralnes, B.V. v. City of Greenwood Village, 583 F. Supp. 830, 841 (D. Colo.
1984) (upholding annexation agreement that limited city's power to rezone for 25 years).
There is no consideration of the time element in this court's decision.
288. See Kessler, supra note 116, at 451.
289. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see also Sigg, supra note 7. A full treatment of dealmaking and the increased use of development agreements is beyond the scope
of this paper. The most thorough treatment of the topic is by Professor Wegner. See
generally Wegner, supra note 268.
290. See Wegner, supra note 268, at 1023-27 (discussing possible limitations on "extractions" imposed as part of a development agreement).

Although Wegner suggests that

there are limits beyond those imposed under a theory of unconscionability, she herself
admits that "a contractor with the government has the freedom to contract or to walk away
from the proposed deal." Id. at 1024. This does not mean that the landowner is not
entitled to a land use approval, only that the government may agree to a land use approval,
and that the government may agree to vest property rights beyond three years on a "take it
or leave it" basis.
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government may use development agreements. The statute appears,
however, to allow the agreements only for the purpose of exceeding the
three year vesting period and only when the government considers the
statutory criteria. 291 The government should not be permitted to use
development agreements to avoid the procedures and standards for
land use approvals which are contained in state laws and local ordinances. The local government should, however, be permitted to condition its acceptance to enter into a development agreement on whatever
terms it chooses. Nothing in the statute entitles a landowner to compel
the local government to enter into a development agreement. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the agreement should be based on the
arms-length negotiations of the parties. The local government's assent
to vest a development right might very well be conditioned on performance by the landowner. The government could not have required this
under either state or local laws or the federal constitution.
A final issue regarding development agreements concerns their reviewability. First, who, if anyone, will have standing to challenge a development agreement? By statute, the agreement must be adopted by a
legislative act and is subject to referendum. One must presume that an
aggrieved citizen could challenge the government's decision to enter
into the agreement. The statute itself makes no effort, unfortunately, to
identify any person or group of persons who might have standing to
challenge the development agreement.
Similarly, it is uncertain under the statute as to whether a local government must consider the factors of the "size and phasing of the development, economic cycles, and market conditions" before entering into
an agreement. 2 92 Section 24-68-104(2) provides that these are some of
the "relevant circumstances" on which the government may base a decision to enter into a development agreement, but they are not the only
factors. 293 If a court does not consider the statutory factors to be controlling, a court should review the government's decision to enter into a
development agreement under a minimum rationality standard. 2 94
291.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987).

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that local
zoning ordinance that, inter alia, prohibited multi-family housing was constitutional because it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose). This standard of review
assumes that adoption of a development agreement truly is a legislative act as the statute
suggests. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987). Under the standards established by the supreme court in Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371
(1975), the act appears to be more quasi-judicial or administrative in nature. See supra note
193. Thus, review would be through a Rule 106 action. Snyder, 189 Colo. at 427, 542 P.2d
at 375. Section 24-68-104(2) only provides that adoption of a development agreement is a
legislative act and subject to referendum. Thus, it still is possible that Rule 106 is the
proper procedure for judicial review of a development agreement. See Margolis v. District
Court, 638 P.2d 297, 304-05 (1981) (small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial for purposes of
judicial review and legislative for purpose of initiative and referendum process). The issue
probably will center around whether a court will defer to the legislature's judgment that
adoption of a development agreement is a legislative act for purposes of both judicial
review and initiative and referendum.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

Conversely, no one should have standing to review the validity of the
29 5
government's refusal to enter into the contract.
E.

What is the Relationship Between S.B. 219 and Federal Constitutional
Law?

Senate Bill No. 219 provides that nothing in the law should "preclude [a] judicial determination, based on common law principles, that a
vested property right exists in a particular case or that a compensable
taking has occurred."' 29 6 This provision does little more than make explicit that the rights created by S.B. 219 are in addition to rights a landowner has at common law.
The more important relationship is between S.B. 219 and federal
constitutional law. The federal constitution requires that a state or local
government pay just compensation to a property owner whenever the
government "takes" the owner's property. 29 7 A taking may occur when
the government physically invades an owner's property or when the government subjects the property to an unreasonably restrictive police
power regulation.2 98 In the latter instance, the Supreme Court may find
a taking when a regulation denies an owner all reasonable use of his or
her property, works a substantial diminution in value or extracts a property interest from the owner without substantially advancing a legitimate
state interest. 29 9 The United States Supreme Court has even given a
constitutional dimension to the common law's vested rights doctrine by
virtue of its own reasonable, investment-backed expectations test for a
30 0
taking.
Senate Bill No. 219 relates to federal takings jurisprudence in a
straight-forward manner. The federal constitution does not define
property or property rights. Instead, independent sources, such as state
law, define the nature of the rights that a property owner may claim. 30 '
The Supreme Court has compared a property right to a legitimate claim
295. A developer would need to argue that section 24-68-104(2) creates an entitlement
to have the government enter into a development agreement when the developer makes
the necessary showing regarding the size and phasing of the development, economic cycles, and market conditions. This section, however, expressly "authorize[s]" local governments to "enter into development agreements."

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp.

1987). The authority to enter into a development agreement cannot be read to create a
duty in the government to enter into development agreements.

296. Id. at § 24-68-106(3).
297. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-

les, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) (holding that the landowner is entitled to just compensation when government regulation effects even a temporary taking of property).
298. See Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978)
(discussing takings from the viewpoint of the character of the government's action).
299. See id. at 124; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987)
(holding that condition on development approval that landowner dedicate lateral beach
easement did not substantially advance legitimate state interest and thus constitute a
taking).
300. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-07 (1984) (discussing in
detail the prerequisites to establish a "reasonable investment-backed expectation").
301.

See id. at 1001. In Moranto, the court found that trade secrets constituted prop-

erty under Missouri law and were therefore within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
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of entitlement, which is an expectation of gaining some benefit that is
more than a mere hope or desire. 30 2 The expectation may not be unilat3 03
eral but must be based on some bilateral relationship.
Traditionally, a landowner in Colorado had no legitimate claim of
entitlement to be free from land use regulations adopted or applied after the landowner had obtained some government approval. Detrimental reliance, probably on a building permit, would have been necessary
to vest the development right. 30

4

Senate Bill No. 219 creates a legiti-

mate claim of entitlement to a vested right immediately on the government's approval of a site specific development plan. The VPR is more
than a mere incident of property ownership that remains subject to police power regulation. By definition, the VPR is immune from interference by police power regulations adopted or applied after establishment
of the VPR for a period of three years. 30 5 As a consequence, because
302. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the court confirmed
that property interests are not created by the Constitution, rather "they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. at 577. The court also explained that "to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it." Id.
303. See id. To claim a property interest, a person "must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.
Although Roth dealt with a procedural due process claim, its discussion of property rights
should apply equally to taking claims. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, citing Roth in its
discussion of whether trade secrets are property for purposes of the taking clause.
304. See supra note 139.
305. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38
(1982) (holding that state law, which authorized cable television company to invade landowner's property, permanently and physically constituted a per se taking). In Loretto, the
court felt that there was something special about the right to exclusive physical possession.
Although the scope of Loretto has been undermined, see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding right of citizens under state law to disseminate
information at private shopping center), its point is well taken. There are certain attributes of property, which may vary from time to time and place to place, that are so tied up
with the concept of property itself that if the government interferes with those attributes,
the government's action constitutes a taking. The Supreme Court has emphasized two
major "attributes" of property that may serve to define property operationally - exclusive
physical possession and reasonable use. If the government interferes with either of these
attributes, the court is likely to find a taking. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987). The Court has been less protective of other attributes of property or property
ownership., e.g., the power to transfer ownership to another. See Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979) (upholding federal prohibition on the sale of pre-existing avarian artifacts).
If a state defines property in a way that elevates an attribute of property ownership to the
level of exclusive possession or reasonable/beneficial use, the court should afford that
attribute the same constitutional protections which it affords the latter attributes.
This analysis of what constitutes fundamental aspects of property ownership, which
aspects may be defined by state law, is difficult to reconcile with Monsanto. In that case, the
Court first determined that Monsanto had a property interest in trade secrets and that the
fundamental aspect of a trade secret was exclusive possession. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002.
The Court, nevertheless, held that Monsanto had no reasonable, investment backed expectation that would prevent the federal government from disclosing Monsanto's trade
secrets, thereby destroying them. Id. at 1006-07. The Court did hold, however, that during a period when federal law provided that trade secret data would not be revealed except
on certain conditions, Monsanto had a reasonable, investment backed expectation that
would cause government disclosure of the data to constitute a taking for which Monsanto
would be entitled to just compensation. Id. at 1010-11. The Court does not explain why a
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state law now establishes a new right that attaches to land ownership,
the local government's interference with that right-the VPR-will
render the government liable for the payment of just compensation. If
the local government interferes with a VPR, it may be required to pay
just compensation to the property owner. Just compensation will equal
the fair market value of the VPR, which will include the diminution in
30 6
the value of the land to which the VPR was attached.
Arguably, section 24-68-105(1)(c) avoids the result described above
by limiting just compensation evolving from reliance damages and exproperty owner must undertake reasonable investments in order to secure a right to exclusive possession of property. In contrast, Loretto did not inquire into whether an apartment
building owner incurred reasonable investments, rather Loretto focused on the character of
the government's action. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
Whatever the rationale for Monsanto, the situation should be different when the state
establishes that a landowner acquires a right to complete development and use of property
for three years following approval of site specific development plan and that the owner
need not make any reasonable investment to secure that right. Thus, the state defines a
fundamental attribute of property and negates any need for detrimental reliance to secure
that right against changes in government regulations. Although a state should be able to
repeal a statute creating vested property rights, the statute should be permitted to operate
prospectively only because property owners who have acquired VPRs should be able to
rely on the government's representation that reliance is unnecessary to vest a right. At the
very minimum, the government, if it repealed a statute that vested development rights
without detrimental reliance, must afford the owner a reasonable time period to commence development before extinguishing the vested development right. Compare FLA.
STAT. § 380.06(4), (20) (1988) (concerning the termination of vested rights in subdivision
against changes in the law pursuant to Florida's developments of regional impact ("DRI")
law). Formerly, under Chapter 380, owners of certain platted lands in Florida could be
vested without any detrimental reliance against changes in DRI regulations, while other
persons could vest their rights only by reliance. In 1985, Florida adopted a new, comprehensive land use management scheme that required owners to notify the government of
their claims of vested rights and allowed vested owners to undertake development within a
certain time period or else they would lose their vested status. The statute appears to
require owners who vested without reliance to notify the government of their claims, but it
does not terminate those rights except for failure to notify the government.
All that has been said to this point has assumed that government interference with a
VPR should constitute a taking. Equally arguable is that interference will be a violation of
substantive due process. Compare Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that applicant for building permit suffered substantive due process violation when government arbitrarily withheld permit). A substantive due process violation is
remediable under section 1983, which affords a right to money damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982).
306. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 191-92 n.12 (1985) (discussing measure of damages for taking as a
result of interference with a vested property right). Clearly, if a property owner had a VPR
to build a ten-story building and the government downzones the property to five stories,
the owner has had five stories of development rights taken for which he should be compensated. The compensation might be based on the diminution in the value of the owners's estate in land or on the fair market value of the development rights that the
government has taken (assuming those two measures would yield different results). See
also Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo. 360, 365-66, 520 P.2d 738, 74142 (1974) (discussing existence of inverse condemnation action in Colorado and holding
that exemplary damages are not available in such action). Ossman concerns a physical invasion of property. In Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 323, 483 P.2d 953, 956
(1971), the court also suggested that a zoning regulation that denies all owners any reasonable use of his or her property could constitute either a taking of property without just
compensation or a violation of due process. Since S.B. 219 reserves to the landowner a
right to claim a taking under common law principles, the statutory limitation on compensation may be irrelevant to a state inverse condemnation action.
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cluding compensation for "diminution in the value of the property
which is caused by such action" 30 7 that interferes with the VPR. There
are two answers to this argument. First, the section probably does no
more than delineate a state law remedy for interference with a VPR.
The section does not exclude a claim for relief under federal law which
applies federal rules on the elements ofjust compensation. Second, the
passage cannot be read as creating a diminutive property right- one for
which the owner of the right is entitled only to partial compensation
when it is taken. The United States Supreme Court has not adopted the
"half-a-loaf" theory of property rights. The theory would permit the
government to interfere with a so-called property right through any process established by the state, on the theory that the process for protecting the right is merely a reflection of the scope of the right in the first
instance.3 0 8 The court has taken an all-or-nothing approach with regard
to property rights. If a property right exists, the government will be
subject to the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment and the owner will be compensated if the government takes
the property right. 3 0

9

In short, the apparent limitation of section 24-68-

105(l)(c) on government liability for interference with a VPR should
give little comfort to a local government which may be liable under federal law for interference with the VPR.
The five areas discussed in this section of the article are only some
of the many issues that the legislature or courts will need to address at
some future time. In the interim, the much sought-after certainty for
land developers will remain as elusive as the infamous "missing link."
V.

DRAFTING A LOCAL ORDINANCE OR REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT
SENATE BILL

219

At least some of the ambiguities of S.B. 219 may be cleared up if a
local government adopts a sufficiently specific local ordinance or regulation to implement the statute. Since local ordinances or regulations may
differ, a landowner must be careful to consult local law before asserting
a claim for a VPR.
307. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
308. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion by
Justice Rehnquist arguing that state could deprive a person of property interest pursuant
to state-established procedures that might not comport with due process because the procedure by which an interest may be deprived serves to define the scope of the property
interest in the first instance). Other courts have been less certain about the relationship
between procedures to protect individual interests and the existence of property rights.
See, e.g., Shelton v.City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir.) ("a state's use of
an adjudication-like mechanism for zoning decisions does not by itself . . . create such
[protected] property rights"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 89 (1986).
309. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978) (noting that Rehnquist
has not obtained a majority for his positivist view of property rights); see also Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (majority dearly rejects Rehnquist's positivist view of property rights). Although cases like Arnett and Loudermill arise in
the context of procedural rights that a state affords to property rights, the analysis should
apply equally when a state purports to offer less than just compensation when it takes a
property right.
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Should the Local Government Implement Senate Bill 219 by Ordinance or
Regulation?

Section 24-68-102(4) permits a local government to determine what
constitutes a site specific development plan by "ordinance or regulation.'310 This language permits a local government to delegate the responsibility for determining what constitutes a site specific development
plan to any agency, such as a planning commission, which may enact
regulations to implement S.B. 219.311 From a flexibility point of view, it
may be better to implement S.B. 219 by regulations which may be
amended administratively rather than by ordinance which may be
amended only by legislative action. This flexibility may be important as
local governments learn to live with S.B. 219.
Section 24-68-102(4) appears to authorize a local government to
create a VPR only by entering into development agreements which are
designed to create VPRs when the government approves an agreement.
The section provides that a local government shall determine what constitutes a site specific development plan "either pursuant to ordinance or
regulation or upon an agreement. 3 1 2 If the local government really is
free to choose among three options for determining what constitutes a
site specific development, the government need not adopt an ordinance
or a regulation. This interpretation supports the view that S.B. 219 is
merely an enabling statute.3 1 3 The probable intent of the legislature
was to allow the government to establish a VPR by entering into a development agreement in addition to its adoption of an ordinance or regulation. Obviously, the statute's language poorly executes the legislative
intent.
Possibly, S.B. 219 does not envision that a local government will
adopt an ordinance or regulation of general application regarding
vested rights. Rather, if the government acts by ordinance to approve a
specific land use application, the site specific development plan is established by ordinance. If an administrative agency approves a specific application, then the site specific development plan may be established by
regulation. This approach is consistent with the statutory requirement
that "the document that triggers such vesting shall be so identified at the
time of its approval." ' 3 14 The "document" may refer to the ordinance,
regulation or development agreement establishing the VPR. 3 15 Still, a
310. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
311. The definition of "local government" in S.B. 219 includes any local "commission,
or agency" that has "final approval authority" over a site specific development plan. Id. at
§ 24-68-102(2). One might ask if a commission or agency has "final approval authority"
when its approval is subject to appeal to a zoning board of adjustment or to the local
legislative body.
312. Id. at § 24-68-102(4) (emphasis added).

313. See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
314.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4).

315. It is more reasonable to interpret that "document" refers only to a development
agreement and not a document executed by a legislative body or other agency as part of
the adoption of an ordinance or regulation. Thus, only the document evidencing the development agreement must be identified as establishing a VPR. This interpretation makes
sense if state and, perhaps, local laws already identify those plans or approvals that consti-
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local government would be well-advised to have a general policy regarding the establishment of VPRs. This policy can assist the government in
making site specific determinations on whether a site specific development plan exists. The government may, for example, want to establish
precisely the certainty required for the type and intensity of use necessary for a plan or approval to qualify as a site specific development
3 16
plan.
B.

Which Plans or Approvals Shall the Government Designate as Site Specific
Development Plans?

The statute is not clear about how a site specific development plan
can be in the form of a land use approval, rather than a plan. 3 17 Perhaps
if a land use application is not reasonably certain regarding type and
intensity of use, but the approval of the application is, a site specific
development plan appears.
Assuming a local government need not designate every land use approval and every development plan that a landowner submits to it as a
site specific development plan--even if the approval or plan is reasonably certain as to the type and intensity of use-the government should
be very careful when designating approvals or plans as site specific development plans. The government should exclude from the definition
of these plans any plan involving a natural or man-made hazard in or
near the property that is subject to a land use application. Similarly,
plans or approvals involving environmentally sensitive lands should be
excluded. The government should establish sufficiently specific standards regarding the hazards and environmental considerations that will
exclude a plan or approval from constituting a site specific development
3 18
plan.
tute a site specific development plan. It is not necessary to identify specifically that the
plan or approval, whether accomplished by ordinance or regulation, constitutes a site specific development. When, however, the government and a developer enter into a development agreement, it will not be clear that the parties intended that the agreement establish
a VPR.
A self-executing statute would be consistent with a legislative intent to vest development rights pursuant to state law and without respect to local policy. Indeed, the effective
date of the statute was January 1, 1988, and the approval of any site specific development
plan on or after that date establishes a VPR. The statute did not become effective until
local adoption of an ordinance or regulation of general application. The statute did not
mandate that local governments adopt a general ordinance or regulation. Compare COLO.
REV. STAT. § 30-28-133 (1986) (regarding requirement that counties create planning commission and adopt subdivision regulations by September 1, 1972, or else the Colorado
Land Use Commission would adopt regulations for the county).
316. The courts should defer to a local government's judgment whether a specific development plan or approval lacks the "reasonable certainty" regarding type and intensity
of use necessary to constitute a site specific development plan even if a court holds that
S.B. 219 otherwise is self-executing. Local regulations may be necessary to provide a developer with sufficiently specific standards regarding what the local government believes is
necessary to establish "reasonable certainty." See Beaver Meadows v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985) (regarding standards for approval of a planned unit
development). See also Dahl, supra note 236, at 4.
317.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4).

318. See Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985)
(regarding standards for approval of a planned unit development). The fact that a devel-
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The local government also may exclude development proposals
above certain size thresholds, whether based on the number of units or
acres, from qualifying as a site specific development plan.3 19 Consequently, this policy will minimize the impact of a VPR by restricting its
establishment to downsized developments. As an alternative, the local
government may accomplish the same effect by amending its zoning,
subdivision or other land use approvals to developments that are limited
in size. In fact, the government may incorporate a public need criterion
into its various land use approvals that would permit the government to
deny approval when there is no public need for a rezoning or a subdivision. 320 The government may put the land use applicant to the proof
that other land that is properly zoned or already subdivided is not available for development.3 2 1 The purpose of these government techniques
is to limit the land mass in the jurisdiction that may lay claim to a VPR,
and thereby promote greater flexibility.
C.

How May the Government Condition a Land Use Approval?

Clearly, S. B. 219 provides for the local government to approve a
site specific development conditionally. The landowner's failure to comply with the "terms and conditions [of approval] will result in a forfeiture of the vested property rights."'3 22 Although the forfeiture appears
automatic, the local government should expressly state, in any land use
approval, that the landowner's failure to comply strictly with the terms
and conditions of approval will result in an automatic forfeiture of
vested rights, including any that could otherwise have been obtained
under common law.
oper may acquire a VPR when there is a natural or man-made hazard, see COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-68-105(1)(b) (Supp. 1987), does not mean that a developer has a right to develop
property when the government knows of a natural or man-made hazard in or near the
subject property. It merely means that if the government approves the development, a
VPR is established unless the hazard "could not reasonably have been discovered at the
time .. .[ofl approval." Id. The government can protect itself from approving development when it will be inappropriate to establish a VPR by conditioning approval on the
developer's waiver of a VPR, or better yet, by amending its other land use approval
processes to ensure that land associated with natural or man-made hazards or otherwise
unsuitable for certain types of development cannot receive approval irrespective of the
government's concern over establishment of a VPR. This review of other land use approval processes must be thorough and well thought out.
319.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-103.

320. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-608 (1987) (requiring government to determine
that proposed subdivision is in the public interest). One factor to determine whether a
proposed subdivision is in the public interest is "the basis of the need for the subdivision."
Id. at § 76-3-608(2)(a).
321. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 575,
507 P.2d 23, 28 (1973) (suggesting that rezoning is proper when there is no other available property that could be developed equally as well). In Neuberger v. City of Portland,
288 Or. 155, 163, 603 P.2d 771, 779 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that,
considering the changes in Oregon statutory law, the other "available property" requirement should no longer be a mandatory factor when local governments consider rezoning
proposals. See also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(l)(2)(ii) (1987) (Army Corps of Engineers' criteria
for issuing dredge or fill permits under section 404 of Clean Water Act, including whether
other available land may be developed).
322. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-103(1) (Supp. 1987).

1988]

VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

As a general matter, the government should always condition any
land use approval on the landowner's compliance with all local, state
and federal laws, including both statutes and regulations. The government may also condition a land use approval on the landowner's agreement to commence development within a specific time following the
approval. Similarly, the approval may be conditioned on the landowner's agreement not to abandon the project for any substantial period
of time. As a part of the terms and conditions of a land use approval,
the government should provide that the landowner agrees not to assert
any waiver by the government of its right to claim a forfeiture of the
owner's VPR unless the waiver is in writing and signed by a designated
3 23
government official.
4.

How May a Local Government Protect its Interests When
Entering Into a Development Agreement?

Development agreements could easily be the topic of an entire article;3 24 thus only a few brief comments will be made. Since the agreement should be the result of an arms-length negotiation, each partygovernment and landowner-should be able to insist on whatever terms
and conditions that it wants before consenting to the agreement. When
the government requires a landowner either to perform or promise to
perform certain acts as part of the owner's consideration, the requirements should not be subject to due process challenge any more than
3 25
other contracts that the government may enter.
In the development agreement, the government should insist on
several exculpatory clauses. First, the landowner will limit any claim
based on the government's alleged breach of the agreement to state law
contract claims. Second, the government will not be liable for breach of
the agreement if the conduct giving rise to the breach is mandated by
state or federal law. Third, the government cannot be held liable where
the interference with a VPR is the result of ordinary negligence.
5.

How Does the Government Avoid Interfering with a VPR?

The local government must take care that any land use regulation
adopted subsequent to establishment of a VPR does not interfere with
323. An interesting issue is whether the government may condition approval of land
use application on the applicant's waiver of any right to a VPR. The possibility runs contrary to the entire intent of S.B. 219, though a government might impose the condition
where it believes that vesting would be detrimental to public health and safety as applied
to a specific situation-for example, hillside or flood plain development. See supra notes
238-39 and accompanying text. The government, however, may condition approval of
certain developments involving natural or man-made hazards on the landowner's submission of sufficient data to permit the government to discover possible hazards relating to
development, no matter how remote. The government could agree to waive the requirement if the developer waives any claim to a VPR following approval. It is doubtful, however, that the government could impose artificially restrictive conditions on development
that the government would waive in exchange for the landowner's waiver of any claim to a
VPR. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 n.5 (1987).
324. See Wegner, supra note 268.
325. See supra note 274.
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the VPR. Section 24-68-105(1) does not require actual interference with
a VPR before compensation is paid: it is only necessary that a "zoning
or land use action ... would alter, impair, prevent, diminish, or otherwise
delay the development or use of the property. ' 3 26 The possibility exists
that a newly-enacted land use regulation that is not of the type considered in section 24-68-105(2) and that does not expressly exempt
properties subject to a VPR will violate the statute's prohibition on interference, except on payment of just compensation. Thus, the government should include boiler-plate provisions in all land use regulations
exempting all properties subject to a VPR, but only for the time for
3 27
which the VPR is effective with respect to each exempt property.
CONCLUSION

The proponents of Senate Bill No. 219 sought to introduce certainty into the real estate development process, but unfortunately, the
attempt was made by radically altering the existing common law vested
rights doctrine. Even assuming one could accept the political decision
that the Colorado legislature has made, one still must question the wisdom of adopting a law as opaque as S.B. 219. The concept of vested
rights is a difficult one that courts have struggled with for decades. Colorado courts now must struggle with the mysteries of both common law
and statutory vested rights.

326. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
327. As discussed elsewhere, there should be few land use regulations of general application that actually interfere with a VPR, and even those regulations that are site-specific
may no longer alter the "terms and conditions" of approval of the site specific development plan. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text. Thus, a local government
should not be overly generous in granting exemptions from its land use regulations. The
government also may avoid establishment of a VPR by limiting "approvals" until late in
the land development process. Section 24-68-103(1) provides that the VPR is established
when the government approves or conditionally approves the land use application. Thus,
the government may be able to amend its land use regulations to the land use applications
receiving something similar to tentative or preliminary approval. Similarly, consistent with
procedural due process requirements, the government may decline to give notice of and to
hold a hearing on land use applications until late in the regulatory process, thereby defeating establishment of a VPR. Id. (VPR created when plan is approved following notice and
hearing).

